On 5/15/2014 5:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 16 May 2014 01:59, meekerdb <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 5/14/2014 11:30 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



    On 15 May 2014 16:24, meekerdb <[email protected] 
<mailto:[email protected]>>
    wrote:

        On 5/14/2014 9:51 PM, Dennis Ochei wrote:
        But then the identity relationship is no longer transitive...

        Suppose a brave officer to have been flogged when a boy at school, for 
robbing
        an orchard, to have taken a standard from the enemy in his first 
campaign, and
        to have been made a general in advanced life: Suppose also, which must 
be
        admitted to be possible, that when he took the standard, he was 
conscious of
        his having been flogged at school, and that when made a general he was
        conscious of his taking the standard, but had absolutely lost the
        consciousness of his flogging.
          These things being supposed, it follows, from Mr LOCKE’S doctrine, 
that he
        who was flogged at school is the same person who took the standard, and 
that
        he who took the standard is the same person who was made a general. 
Whence it
        follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same 
person
        with him who was flogged at school. But the general’s consciousness 
does not
        reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, according to Mr
        LOCKE’S doctrine, he is not the person who was flogged. There- fore the
        general is, and at the same time is not the same person with him who was
        flogged at a school.

        Hence the common sense theory that person's are defined by bodily 
continuity.


    It's only a common sense notion because we can't go around duplicating 
ourselves,
    meeting our duplicates, rewriting our memories and so on.

    Another point in favor of the common sense idea.  But why would it matter 
if we
    could.  Duplicates would be new persons.


What would happen to the common sense theory of bodily continuity if teleportation, with or without destruction of the original, were possible and commonplace?

We'd adopt some rule as to who was who. Without destruction it would be the original. With destruction we might say they are equal heirs.

Brent

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