On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 May 2014 14:12, <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue
into a
theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that either
his
premises or his argument is wrong...
I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't gone
down that
road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it. I shall
probably
try again.
Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the arguments you
and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know Bruno has said he does have a
theory of everything, which is subject to falsification... which it seems to me is an
awful lot to derive from the idea that consciousness arises from computation
I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore consciousness)
can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is dispensable.
Brent
... but I guess some relatively simple idea can sometimes lead to a huge theory ...
maybe when (or if) I get to grips with the MGA and the logic involved in deriving some
features of physics from comp, I might have something more sensible to say on the matter,
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
