On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 28 May 2014 14:12, <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: >>> >>> As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to segue >>> into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show that >>> either his premises or his argument is wrong... >>> >> >> I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't >> gone down that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to >> drop it. I shall probably try again. >> > > Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the > arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know > Bruno has said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to > falsification... which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the > idea that consciousness arises from computation > > I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore > consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is > dispensable. >
Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?) I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification of information" it on, though. If that *is* established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to derive "it from bit". -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
