On 5/28/2014 12:35 AM, LizR wrote:
On 28 May 2014 16:20, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 5/27/2014 7:36 PM, LizR wrote:
On 28 May 2014 14:12, <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Wednesday, May 28, 2014 2:24:39 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote:
As far as I can see Bruno has a logical argument which happens to
segue
into a theory of physics. To disprove it, one merely needs to show
that
either his premises or his argument is wrong...
I don't agree with you about that, but for point of order, I haven't
gone down
that road anyway. He's wrong about falsification. I did try to drop it.
I shall
probably try again.
Bruno may well be wrong about falsification. I haven't tried to follow the
arguments you and he have had on the subject, or not very much. I know
Bruno has
said he does have a theory of everything, which is subject to
falsification...
which it seems to me is an awful lot to derive from the idea that
consciousness
arises from computation
I think the more crucial step is arguing that computation (and therefore
consciousness) can exist without physics. That physical instantiation is
dispensable.
Yes indeed. I would say that for comp to be meaningful, it's necessary to show that
information is a real (and fundamental) thing, rather than something that only has
relevance / meaning to us - I suppose deriving the entropy of a black hole, the
Beckenstein bound and the holographic principle all hint that this is the case. (Maybe
QM unitarity and the black hole information paradox too?)
I'm not sure how secure a footing any of these items put the "reification of
information" it on, though.
As Bruno has noted, we live on border between order and chaos - neither maximum nor
minimum information/entropy but something like "complexity". Here's recent survey of ways
to quantify it by Scott Aaronso, Sean Carroll and Lauren Ouellette.
http://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=1818
Brent
If that /is/ established, then I guess comp becomes one potential route to derive "it
from bit".
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