On 03 Jun 2014, at 04:23, [email protected] wrote:



On Monday, June 2, 2014 4:20:16 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 01 Jun 2014, at 18:22, [email protected] wrote:



On Saturday, May 31, 2014 2:09:57 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




There was nothing devious about the Salvia posting. I actually pasted the key lines to the top of the post, and added comments. Clearly indicating that for me, the salient point about the article was that the distinguishing features of Salvia have now been identified, and that they closely correspond with much of what Bruno says and vocabularly around 3D/1D distinctions, talking to the machine, and so on and so forth

Nice.

Nice what way Bruno? Nice like yummy or .nice like "yeah mother fucker I'm with them that say you tried to fuck me up on the salvia thread!"

Not the latter I hope because it's bolliocks and I totally reject it.

?
Nice like "yummy", I would say. Or I misunderstand you even when we agree?



What about the issue itself though?
It isn't reasonable to attack me this way when it happens also to be the case the overwhelming majority of scientists would agree with my position. When Bruno and YOU make claims that scientists accept comp

Yes. Explicitely or implicitly. Of course if you search long enough you will find counter-example. For example I found a cmputer scientist "Jacques Arsac" who said "As I am a catholic, I cannot believe in STRONG AI. He wrote an anti-strong-ai (and thus anti- comp) book on this. But even among the catholic that has been seen as an exceptional view.

Comp is not much. A version is that there is no human internal organ which cannot be replaced by an artificial one having the right functions at the right level.

Which I ould say is true too, but it's going to be something like 'comp is can replace < organA >with <majorRevolutioninFieldA> + <majorRevoltion in field B>....+..+...<major revolution in field N>

In practice? Perhaps. But the reasoning is theoretical. It has to be, to be genuinely testable. The only major scientific discovery that you need is the discovery of the universal (Turing) machine, and some idea how it works.





One of those revolutions will be to have a scientific revolution that differentiate why, say the heart of liver, in which an immense amount of computation takes place,

?  (that is ambiguous).



never becomes conscious.

If there are universal computation, we cannot exclude that some consciousness can be associated to it, but is it playing a role in our consciousness? Well, if yes, it means that we have to lower the substitution level, and ask to the doctor to copy also the liver and the heart, at the right level (which exist by the comp assumption). Keep in mind that the reasoning does not put any bound on the level. You might need to copy the moon too, if not the entire physical universe. This does not change the reversal consequence of computationalism. This follows from the step 7 in the UD Argument. If your mind state is a computational state (and thus belongs to infinitely many computations), the UD will go through that states infinitely often.



Why do I experience consciousness in my head, why not my liver?

That is cultural. The early greeks thought consciousness is experienced in the liver-stomach-belly. Some yoga technic makes it feels like that. I don't think I experience consciousness where I might feel to experience it (even John Clark seems to agree on this).

Actually, you will find many reports of different type in which people describes a feeling that their consciousness is attached to object out of the body, or even to nothing. The idea that "we are in our body" is also a mental construct.








>
Comp is believed also by all creationists who indeed use together with the premise that a machine needs a designer to argue for the existence of a designer God. Of course the second premise is easily refuted by the fact that all (digital) machines probably exist, with their execution, in the solution of the diophantine equations.>


So you are saying you think they effectively believe in something, because there's a logic in comp that parallels some relation they must think at some point involving god and something else?

Not at all. I am saying that they believe in comp, when they argue that biological organism are machines. They use that assumption to prove the existence of god, because they believe also (wrongly) that a machine needs a designer.




This doesn't look right to me. You've got a definition in comp, thus composed of comp-objects.

The expression "composed on comp-object" does not make sense to me.



You say they believe comp, when most of them would probably totally reject that god is anything to do with that.

When I succeed to connect on the net, I can give you many videos on youtube where creationist shows something biological looking like a sophisticated machine, and doing the argument I sum up above. You might find it by googling on "bacteria flagellum creationism youtube" or something, as his one was rather famours (and indeed the video is quite nice and convincing: the base of the flagellum looks indeed a lot to a piece of art in engineering.




Can we really make these sort of inferences without making clear, we don't mean the sort of belief that creationists will have for that word, and at no point or level do we have any reason to think they think they think in terms of comp at all.

They do. Once you argue that the body is a machine, it is mechanism. Of course creationists might not like what I say here, but that is their problem. Some prolife people are also computationalist, in the sense that if we can save the life of someone with tubes and technologies, they esteem that we have the modal obligation to do so, transforming the body of a patient into a machine. of course, in this case we might see if they accept such substitution for the brain also. That is not explicit, but I do the limit of their thought here.




What you are saying is that you think what they are doing in their minds, has a parallel with something that can happen in comp. This is a long way now from they believe in comp.

Once you use the design argument of the creationist, you are using comp. Even if you are not aware of all the consequences of comp.



I mean...and please answer this. Let's say someone is riding a donkey. And the motion of that person and way they hold the donkey exactly parallels someone else riding a zebra. Does this infer the first person is riding a zebra?

No.



Or do I miss the point?

Your analogy is not valid. Unless your point is that creationist use mechanism, and not *digital* mechanism, but then the designer argument is no more effective.










and clearly infer that they will also accept Bruno's workthroughs on comp, What are you insinuating? Could you find one scientist having ention a problem (except J.P. Delahaye)?


Are you aware that 'insinuating' suggests an underhand way of ding things? Where do you stand on what PGC has said to me?

What I'm not insinuating old boy, but saying explicitly and directly, is that I'm not clear it's appropriate to say what people believe, unless they've said they believe it. Are you assuming things like this:

Scientist believes comp= --> Bruno's criteria is assuming-com --> brunos's UDA follows --> Stuff about consciousness outside the head follows

--> MWI follows

--> Infinite dreams follows

Yes. (modulo some ambiguity in your formulation).






* So where does it end? Do scientists all believe MWI?

Not at all. If someone believes in P, and if P -> Q is true, that person will not necessarily believes in Q. He/She must first understand that P -> Q, and thus read and study the proof.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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