On 10 May 2014 20:12, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Sat, May 10, 2014 at 8:30 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 10 May 2014 17:30, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Saturday, May 10, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> I guess one could start from "is physics computable?" (As Max Tegmark >>>> discusses in his book, but I haven't yet read what his conclusions are, if >>>> any). If physics is computable and consciousness arises somehow in a >>>> "materialist-type way" from the operation of the brain, then consciousness >>>> will be computable by definition. >>>> >>> >>> Is that trivially obvious to you? The anti-comp crowd claim that even if >>> brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer could be >>> conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not just a >>> simulation, to generate the consciousness. >>> >>> If physics is computable, and consciousness arises from physics with >> nothing extra (supernatural or whatever) then yes. Am I missing something >> obvious? >> > You're missing the step where you explain how doing the computations generates consciousness. That is what I understand "consciousness is computable" to mean.
> > Yeah, I always feel the same about this sort of argument. It seems so > trivial to disprove: > > "even if brain behaviour is computable that does not mean that a computer > could be conscious, since it may require the actual brain matter, and not > just a simulation, to generate the consciousness." > > 1. If brain behaviour is computable and (let's say comp) > Not "and let's say comp", since that is what you are setting out to prove > 2. brain generates consciousness but > 3. it requires actual brain matter to do so then > 4. brain behaviour is not computable (~comp) > No, that doesn't follow. That brain behaviour is computable means that we are able to compute such things as the sequence in which neurons will fire and the effect neuronal activity will have on muscle. > so comp = ~comp > > I also wonder if I'm missing something, since I hear this one a lot. > A computer model of a thunderstorm will predict the behaviour of a real thunderstorm but it won't be wet. In contrast, I believe that a computer model of a brain will not only predict the behaviour of a real brain but will also be conscious. However, I don't think this is trivially obvious. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
