On 24 Jun 2014, at 15:07, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Tuesday, June 24, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering.

You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter to make your brain prosthesis.

Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you really do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by definition.

It could be that comp is false, so it is impossible to make a digital copy of your biological brain, but a biological copy would work just fine, and "really be you".

That is correct. In that case the biology of the brain has to be non Turing emulable. The brain would be an analog machine of a special kind (as most analog machines are Turing emulable). In fact such copy should be a quantum continuous duplication (like in "continuous quantum teleportation").

I agree. Comp is for 'computation' which is a notion relying fundamentally on digitalness, or discreteness, or integers. Only for those digital machines do we have an effective notion of universality, through the Church-Turing thesis.

Bruno





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Stathis Papaioannou

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