2014-06-25 10:15 GMT+02:00 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > > On 25 Jun 2014, at 09:40, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > > > 2014-06-25 6:52 GMT+02:00 meekerdb <[email protected]>: > >> On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>> >>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter >>> to make your brain prosthesis. >>> >> >> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, >> so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you >> really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. >> >> >> ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a >> prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). >> > > Not only that, as comp stands for *computationalism* so, it also means > that whatever your mind is, it can be captured by a form of computation... > what you're defining here is functionalism (and computationalism is of > course included in functionalism, but not the other way around). > > > > In this list. Yes. But historically (and in many books), "functionalism" > is the term coined by H. Putnam for a particular case of computationalism, > with a brain modeled at an implicit high level by a Turing machine(*). >
Well the term predates hime; and if I look at wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind) *"Its core idea is that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role – that is, they are causal relations to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs."* It tells nothing about how the function is realized... so yes computationalism is a sort of functionalism, but functionalism is broader... it could be that mind is not a computation but a sort of analog machinery could replicate it, so it would be a form of functionalism but not computationalism (or digital mechanism as I see them both as synonym) at all. Quentin > Functionalism, without computationalism, is not a doctrine, as it is fuzzy > about functions and level. You need to define the calss of functions that > are allowed. If you take all functions: it is a basically empty. > > So the term functionalism can mean 'comp' in some context (Putnam, > Cognitive science), and 'non-computationalism' (here). > > You might look at: > > PUTNAM H., 1960, Minds and Machines, Dimensions of Mind : A Symposium, > Sidney > Hook (Ed.), New-York University Press, New-York. Repris dans Anderson A. > R. (Ed.),1964. > > ANDERSON A.R. (ed.), 1964, Minds and Machine, Prentice Hall inc. New > Jersey. Trad. > Française : Pensée et machine, Editions du Champ Vallon, 1983. > > Bruno > > > > > > Quentin > > >> It will be you even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for >> JKC that "you" is both singular and plural). >> >> Brent >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy > Batty/Rutger Hauer) > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy Batty/Rutger Hauer) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
