On 26 Jun 2014, at 05:44, LizR wrote:
On 26 June 2014 15:32, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/25/2014 7:03 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote:
On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for
consciousness, or for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the
argument above, makes that role very mysterious, so much that it
is not clear why we could still say yes to the doctor in virtue of
correct digital rendering.
You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use
matter to make your brain prosthesis.
Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be
you, so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital
copy, you really do die. While in comp the digital copy is you, by
definition.
?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives
you a prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It
will be you even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling
for JKC that "you" is both singular and plural).
Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish
between two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy
different positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could
only ever be a "copy that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would
be one that actually is you (assuming comp is correct, of course).
The Everett copy is different because it cannot interact with it's
original, so they can have the same past including spacetime
location. In Bruno's thought experiment the M copy and the W copy
are physically different. If comp is true then at the most
fundamental level it's impossible to have copies; it would be
like having copies of the number 7.
Insofar as I understand comp, it's not only possible to have copies,
but there are an infinite number of them responsible for every
moment of conscious experience. These are "relative computations" or
something similar. I expect Bruno will explain better when he appears.
You are right, because you are not your description. You are the
abstract (immaterial) person associated with that description, and
associated with any equivalent (at some level) description handled by
the relevant relative universal numbers in arithmetic. Only the first
person view is not first person duplicable (although 3-1 duplicable,
which is what John Clark exploit to "refute" step 3, by confusing the
3-1 view with each 1-view).
OK?
Bruno
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