On 25 June 2014 16:52, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 6/24/2014 2:29 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>> >> >> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter >> to make your brain prosthesis. >> > > Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, > so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you > really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. > > ?? Comp is the theory that it will be you after the doctor gives you a > prothesis for your brain (plus some other assumptions). It will be you > even after you are duplicated (though it's troubling for JKC that "you" is > both singular and plural). > > Yes, that's right. And primitive materialism would distinguish between two identical versions of you, if only because they occupy different positions (and due to no-cloning). So a PM copy could only ever be a "copy that thinks it's you", while a comp copy would be one that actually is you (assuming comp is correct, of course).
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