On 25 June 2014 01:07, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> On Tuesday, June 24, 2014, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 24 June 2014 17:04, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>>> If primitive matter existed, and if it has a role for consciousness, or >>>> for consciousness instantiation, step 8, and the argument above, makes that >>>> role very mysterious, so much that it is not clear why we could still say >>>> yes to the doctor in virtue of correct digital rendering. >>>> >>> >>> You can still say yes to the doctor because he is going to use matter to >>> make your brain prosthesis. >>> >> >> Surely that will just be a copy that thinks it's you - it won't be you, >> so if you are destroyed in the process of making the digital copy, you >> really do die. While in comp the digital copy *is* you, by definition. >> > > It could be that comp is false, so it is impossible to make a digital > copy of your biological brain, but a biological copy would work just fine, > and "really be you". > > It could be, but my point is that you'd need a theory of why two identical material objects are really the same object. I know of no such theory, except perhaps when the objects in question are part of a BEC, but I do know* that comp is based on the assumption that two identical computations are the same thing (as indeed are an infinite number of them) *well, I think I know. Maybe I should say I believe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
