From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Saturday, July 05, 2014 12:05 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Tyson is not atheist (was Re: So, a new kind of non-boolean,
non-digital, computer architecture

 

 

On 04 Jul 2014, at 20:43, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:





 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal

 

 

On 04 Jul 2014, at 10:36, LizR wrote:






On 4 July 2014 18:16, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:




This kind of classification is fine as far as distinguishing believing god
doesn't exist from failing to believe that god does exist.  But it is still
ambiguous because it assumes that "God(s)" is definite.  I don't believe
that personal agent type gods exist; but I'm on the fence about some
creative principle or unnamable truths  that some people would like to call
"God". I believe that theist (e.g. Abrahamic) gods do not exist.

 

I comment Brent first, here.

 

OK. fair enough, but even if the God of the theists does not exist, he might
still have important relationships with the Plotinus ONE, or even with the
notion of arithmetical truth as pointed too by a machine. 

 

But doesn't "God" imply an Identity, which cannot by its very nature be all
things, 

 

I am not sure what makes you think I defined God by "all thing". It is more
the truth about all things. This can be shown to be non definable, and as
such might not have an identity in the sense you are using that term here. 

 

The point I was trying to make was about the common conception of God as of
some all-powerful, all-knowing deity. Even in faiths that prohibit, any
explicit depiction of God this external identifiable conceptualized being
exists - at least in so far as the believers are concerned. 

If we speak of some formless ineffable truth or force perhaps existing in
all things, then I agree with your sense of it (and seek to experience
moments of flow of as well), but often, the word symbol God - at least for
me perhaps - conjures up a theist god of one brand or another - doesn't
really matter.

 

 





because Identity always is - and must be - defined in terms of a larger set;
i.e. good is defined in terms of evil both within some larger set that
encompasses both. The ineffable, indescribable essence is without Identity.

 

You might elaborate, as I am not even sure "identity" applies here. I would
say it is not without identity, nor with identity. I suspect a category
error.

 

Words are symbols, and symbolic meaning can only exist within a context.
When we give something Identity - even a supreme being we are implicitly
conceptualizing this supreme being within some even larger context. Being
needs context in order to be. Definition requires contrast. 

It is a very hard habit to escape and set aside. our minds are always
defining things for us and we naturally tend to hang some kind of identity
on our various deities. 

I would say outside of the identifiable.

 

Bruno

 

 

 





Chris

 

In all texts, I take what is convincing, and let what I don't understand for
further reflexion.

 

 

And here I comment Liz:






 

OK. Although string theory almost certainly predicts that they exist
somewhere (but not in our corner of the multiverse).

 

Really? I doubt this. Daemon capable of imitating God might be prove to
exist, in both some QM-GR theory, and in arithmetic, but for God itself, I
am afraid it is more transcendent than any seemingly being in any realm. In
the terrestrial (effective) realm, you can't distinguish God from the Devil.
The most which can make (G*- non communicable) sense is that you eventually
remember who you are, being God, or the Devil. It is the only way you might
be able to differentiate them.

 

Bruno

 

 






 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Reply via email to