On Saturday, August 9, 2014, Pierz <pier...@gmail.com> wrote: > In "The Conscious Mind", Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has > failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between > 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply > means that if A supervenes on B, then B logically and necessarily entails > A. Because we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie, then it > seems that consciousness cannot *logically* supervene on the physical. > There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails or even > *suggests* the arising of subjective experiences in any system, > biological or otherwise. This is a well-trodden path of argumentation that > I'm sure we're all familiar with. However, since it does appear that, > empirically, consciousness supervenes on physical processes, then this > supervenience must be "natural" rather than logical. It must arise due to > some natural law that demands it does. >
I think Chalmers' own "Fading Qualia" argument shows that zombies are absurd and hence proves comp, although Chalmers himself does not go so far as to claim this. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
