On Saturday, August 9, 2014, Pierz <[email protected]> wrote: > In "The Conscious Mind", Chalmers bases his claim that materialism has > failed to provide an explanation for consciousness on a distinction between > 'logical' and 'natural' supervenience, where logical supervenience simply > means that if A supervenes on B, then B logically and necessarily entails > A. Because we can logically conceive of a (philosophical) zombie, then it > seems that consciousness cannot *logically* supervene on the physical. > There is simply nothing in the physical description that entails or even > *suggests* the arising of subjective experiences in any system, > biological or otherwise. This is a well-trodden path of argumentation that > I'm sure we're all familiar with. However, since it does appear that, > empirically, consciousness supervenes on physical processes, then this > supervenience must be "natural" rather than logical. It must arise due to > some natural law that demands it does. >
I think Chalmers' own "Fading Qualia" argument shows that zombies are absurd and hence proves comp, although Chalmers himself does not go so far as to claim this. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
