On 21 Aug 2014, at 11:52, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno: We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition.
Richard: I sure did miss that part. I presumed that consciousness
required life. Could you explain a bit why comp requires
consciousness with or without life? I do not even understand how
something can be required by definition.
Computationalism is the doctrine which asserts that consciousness can
be preserved through the substitution of body parts at some
description level.
Without consciousness, this would not make sense.
It is an hypothesis in "philosophy of mind", or "theology" (whatever).
It is sometimes confused with the statement that the physical reality
(whatever that is) can be simulated exactly by a computer, or
generated by some program, and I have often explained that this is a
priori in opposition of comp, where the physical reality became the
result of the FPI on *all* computations: this a priori cannot be
simulated by a program.
Consciousness does not require life per se. It requires, with comp,
only one computation, except that you will need all computations to
give some stability for that conscious experiences. But you have
already got all computations when you assume elementary arithmetic, or
any Turing complete theory.
*Human* consciousness requires very plausibly the type of life we know
on Earth, at least for a large part of its story, but even this will
requires that consciousness emerges from the infinity of computations
which exists as a consequence of arithmetic. Indeed, everything
physical emerges from the measure on all computations.
Bruno
On Thu, Aug 21, 2014 at 3:26 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 20 Aug 2014, at 15:42, Richard Ruquist wrote:
Bruno,
Could you explain again why a measure is needed in Everettian Many
World Theories?
To justify the probability used with the Born Rule (asssuming the
SWE, QM)
In comp, we don't assume QM, but we need a measure to justify the
stability of the physical laws, or the invariant in the observations.
Your 1p observer requirement for measure suggests that the physical
came from life.
Hmm... Life of the numbers, in a different sense that "terrestrial
life".
I have asked you this before and your response is that the universe
would still evolve
but "weakly", whatever that means, in the absence of observers.
?
I don't remember.
All this is justified by the UDA, in the comp (not related a priori
to QM) frame.
The requirement for observers in my mind makes comp equivalent to
the Copenhagen Interpretation CI
in the need for conscious observers and is falsified along with CI
for that reason.
We assume comp, which requires consciousness by definition. Then the
TOE is given by two little formula like:
Kxy = x
Sxyz = xz(yz)
And nothing more. I could take only addition and multiplication of
natural numbers.
You might miss something in the UDA, which should answer your
question.
Bruno
Richard
On Wed, Aug 20, 2014 at 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 19 Aug 2014, at 03:37, John Mikes wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical
reality in which there is no observers at all.
Why not? Are you saying there must have been observers in the
early universe, even before the recombination? Must there be
observers observing the interior of stars for them to be
"physically real"? What does "physically real" mean in your theory?
Brent
--------------------------
Physically real is our religion as 'lately human scientists' where
theory is god.
Hmm.... Physically *primitive* is the (aristotelian) theology of
most scientists and philosophers, sometimes not realizing that it
is a theology.
Theory = hypotheses, without which there is no science (= doubt).
It comes through the (development)evolution of us, humans into a
"know-it-all"- all explaining animal.
BTW in my agnosticism (sorry, Bruno) the OBSERVER is anything that
observes - i.e. notices anything at all.
It is too vague, so I agree by default. I prefer to ask for a
universal number, just to fix the thing, but both with comp and
with Everett QM, we can extend the notion of observer greatly. No
problem.
No 'existence' is identifiable without observers,
No *physical* 'existence' is identifiable without observers. But
the existence of 17 is independent of us, in any scientific context
rich enough to postulate computationalism.
the world would be a heap of unrelated singularities by/for
themselves.
Why?
No arithmetix either!
Then you are not agnostic on the computationalist hypothesis. By
some miracle, a bit like Craig, you seem to believe that you know
that comp is false. I am agnostic, and will be, as long as comp is
not refuted.
Bruno
John M
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 2:28 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/18/2014 4:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The laws will always assured the existence of computations in
which you survive, and have that quantum MW aspects, but in some
consciousness state we might live some "phase transition" between
different physical realms. Obviously, we cannot get a physical
reality in which there is no observers at all.
Why not? Are you saying there must have been observers in the
early universe, even before the recombination? Must there be
observers observing the interior of stars for them to be
"physically real"? What does "physically real" mean in your theory?
Brent
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