I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It seems to be that the argument goes ...
Assume computational process A is conscious Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same machine states as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by a recording of A - B isn't conscious because it isn't counterfactually correct. I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume consciousness doesn't supervene on material processes, then neither A nor B is conscious, they are just somehow attached to conscious experiences generated elsewhere, maybe by a UD.) On 12 August 2014 09:40, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > Got it, thanks. Not too long so I will be able to read it in the near > future :-) > > I hope that is just an honest mistake, Bruno, and no one has been messing > with your email deliberately. Do you have another email you can use? (e.g. > a GMail one) > > > On 11 August 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > >> >> On 11 Aug 2014, at 06:42, Russell Standish wrote: >> >> Apologies to everybody. For some reason, when I clicked "publish", >>> Wordpress posted an earlier draft of the post, not the most recent one >>> I was working on. >>> >>> I have now restored the correct version of the post - follow the link >>> "Draft paper here" to find the paper. >>> >> >> >> I got it. I will read it. >> >> ... >> >> It looks now, that I have lost the ability to read my mails. Apparently >> someone deleted my password at my ULB account. It might take some time >> before I can read my mail again. >> >> Sorry. It is a good thing that I got your text before this happened. I >> might soon been unable to send message, too. >> >> Bruno >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> Cheers >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 08:08:55PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>> >>>> On 8/10/2014 3:38 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> >>>>> As long, long time promised, I now have a draft of my "MGA revisited" >>>>> paper for critical comment. I have uploaded this to my blog, which >>>>> gives people the ability to attach comments. >>>>> >>>>> http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73 >>>>> >>>>> Whilst I'm happy I now understand the issue, I still not happy with >>>>> how I've expressed it - the text could still do with some work. >>>>> >>>>> So let the games begin! >>>>> >>>>> I went to your blog and I found: >>>> >>>> /In this paper, we reexamine Bruno Marchal's Movie Graph// >>>> //Argument, which demonstrates a basic incompatibility between// >>>> //computationalism and materialism. We discover that the >>>> incompatibility// >>>> //is only manifest in singular classical-like universes. If we accept// >>>> //that we live in a Multiverse, then the incompatibility goes away, >>>> but// >>>> //in that case another line of argument shows that with// >>>> //computationalism, fundamental, or primitive materiality has no >>>> causal// >>>> //influence on what is observed, which must must be derivable from >>>> basic// >>>> //arithmetic properties./ >>>> >>>> But I didn't find "this paper"? >>>> >>>> Brent >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ---------------- >>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>> >>> Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret >>> (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> ---------------- >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
