On 12 Aug 2014, at 15:20, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 1:57 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 8/11/2014 5:13 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 12:22 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:
Having now read the paper,
Ok, I finished it too. Russell's "state of the art" is a very nice
introduction to the MGA and Maudlin's argument. Very clear and
concise, helped me organize my thoughts on these.
ISTM that the "counterfactual" part of the argument is the only
part that I really don't get. Or rather ISTM that it demonstrates
that consciousness can't supervene on physical computational
states, because those states can't know anything about these
counterfactuals, which by definition don't happen.
I think the point here is that if we assume consciousness
supervenes on matter, then we are forced to reject comp, by
reductio ad absurdum.
I think the mistake, the reductio, is the assumption that
consciousness can supervene on this piece of matter without
reference to the world in which the matter exists.
This smells of dualism. What is "the world in which the matter
exists" if not matter?
Yes, the problem here is that Brent needs either *primitive* matter,
and then step 8 will show that it is something like a gap-of-the-god.
As long as matter is 3p definable, a brain cannot immediately
distinguish it with a program, or with the FPI on all programs, and
that is why the FPI will fight back on such matter notion. So it has
to be a mysterious thing, non Turing emulable, and non FPI-recoverable.
But why introduce this when the reasoning shows that if such matter
exists, then the logic of []p & p, or other variants (anyone) should
provide a comp-quantum logic distinct from QL. So let us see, before
concluding if we want stay cold (keep the scientific attitude) on that
issue. Brent is just betting that comp will be violated by "nature".
Up to now, the comp-QL does fit with nature.
I see that some people have still a difficulty to get the importance,
which stems from incompleteness of the intensional variance of the [].
It is normal, it asks for more familiarity with mathematical logic,
than , say, the UDA.
Bruno
This fallacy is encouraged by considering conscious thoughts to be
about abstractions like arithmetic and dreams (as though dreams did
not derive from reality).
Dreams both derive from and are reality. Reality is everything that
is, no?
Telmo.
Brent
Any computation supported by matter on which consciousness would
supervene could be replaced with a dumb playback of the sequence of
states produced by the computation (contradicting comp). In the
Klara / Olympia case, Olympia could be made compatible with comp by
being replaceable by Klara to deal with counterfactuals that would
never happen. Enabling / disabling the Olympia / Klara connection
would turn consciousness on or off (contradicting primitive matter,
because the possibility of enabling material computations that
would never happen would determine the presence of absence of
consciousness).
I am writing this to help organize my own thoughts, and hope to be
corrected if I am making a mistake.
Then again, I also have some trouble with the multiverse part. A MV
"is" a quantum computer? How do we know that, without even knowing
the laws of physics?
I think Russell is referring to a MWI multiverse which is
necessarily a quantum computer (we are assuming the wave equation
with MWI, so the laws of physics are known).
I am not convinced that the MWI + the anthropic principle is
equivalent to the subset of the universal dovetailer computations
that supports all possible human experiences. I am also not
convinced that the set of all possible human experiences is finite.
Russell, could you elaborate on these?
(I am going to comment on the blog post too, in a rather redundant
way)
Cheers
Telmo.
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