Having now read the paper, ISTM that the "counterfactual" part of the argument is the only part that I *really* don't get. Or rather ISTM that it demonstrates that consciousness can't supervene on physical computational states, because those states can't know anything about these counterfactuals, which by definition don't happen. Then again, I also have some trouble with the multiverse part. A MV "is" a quantum computer? How do we know that, without even knowing the laws of physics? Is this something to do with Feynman's idea about a QC as something that could perform exact physical simulations? (if I got that right)
On 12 August 2014 11:03, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It seems to be > that the argument goes ... > > Assume computational process A is conscious > Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same machine states > as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by a recording of A - B > isn't conscious because it isn't counterfactually correct. > > I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume consciousness > doesn't supervene on material processes, then neither A nor B is conscious, > they are just somehow attached to conscious experiences generated > elsewhere, maybe by a UD.) > > > > > On 12 August 2014 09:40, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Got it, thanks. Not too long so I will be able to read it in the near >> future :-) >> >> I hope that is just an honest mistake, Bruno, and no one has been messing >> with your email deliberately. Do you have another email you can use? (e.g. >> a GMail one) >> >> >> On 11 August 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> >>> On 11 Aug 2014, at 06:42, Russell Standish wrote: >>> >>> Apologies to everybody. For some reason, when I clicked "publish", >>>> Wordpress posted an earlier draft of the post, not the most recent one >>>> I was working on. >>>> >>>> I have now restored the correct version of the post - follow the link >>>> "Draft paper here" to find the paper. >>>> >>> >>> >>> I got it. I will read it. >>> >>> ... >>> >>> It looks now, that I have lost the ability to read my mails. Apparently >>> someone deleted my password at my ULB account. It might take some time >>> before I can read my mail again. >>> >>> Sorry. It is a good thing that I got your text before this happened. I >>> might soon been unable to send message, too. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> >>>> On Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 08:08:55PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 8/10/2014 3:38 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> As long, long time promised, I now have a draft of my "MGA revisited" >>>>>> paper for critical comment. I have uploaded this to my blog, which >>>>>> gives people the ability to attach comments. >>>>>> >>>>>> http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73 >>>>>> >>>>>> Whilst I'm happy I now understand the issue, I still not happy with >>>>>> how I've expressed it - the text could still do with some work. >>>>>> >>>>>> So let the games begin! >>>>>> >>>>>> I went to your blog and I found: >>>>> >>>>> /In this paper, we reexamine Bruno Marchal's Movie Graph// >>>>> //Argument, which demonstrates a basic incompatibility between// >>>>> //computationalism and materialism. We discover that the >>>>> incompatibility// >>>>> //is only manifest in singular classical-like universes. If we accept// >>>>> //that we live in a Multiverse, then the incompatibility goes away, >>>>> but// >>>>> //in that case another line of argument shows that with// >>>>> //computationalism, fundamental, or primitive materiality has no >>>>> causal// >>>>> //influence on what is observed, which must must be derivable from >>>>> basic// >>>>> //arithmetic properties./ >>>>> >>>>> But I didn't find "this paper"? >>>>> >>>>> Brent >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ---------------- >>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>>> >>>> Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret >>>> (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) >>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>> ---------------- >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to [email protected]. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>> >> >> > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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