On Tue, Aug 12, 2014 at 12:22 AM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > Having now read the paper, >
Ok, I finished it too. Russell's "state of the art" is a very nice introduction to the MGA and Maudlin's argument. Very clear and concise, helped me organize my thoughts on these. > ISTM that the "counterfactual" part of the argument is the only part that > I *really* don't get. Or rather ISTM that it demonstrates that > consciousness can't supervene on physical computational states, because > those states can't know anything about these counterfactuals, which by > definition don't happen. > I think the point here is that if we assume consciousness supervenes on matter, then we are forced to reject comp, by reductio ad absurdum. Any computation supported by matter on which consciousness would supervene could be replaced with a dumb playback of the sequence of states produced by the computation (contradicting comp). In the Klara / Olympia case, Olympia could be made compatible with comp by being replaceable by Klara to deal with counterfactuals that would never happen. Enabling / disabling the Olympia / Klara connection would turn consciousness on or off (contradicting primitive matter, because the possibility of enabling material computations that would never happen would determine the presence of absence of consciousness). I am writing this to help organize my own thoughts, and hope to be corrected if I am making a mistake. > Then again, I also have some trouble with the multiverse part. A MV "is" a > quantum computer? How do we know that, without even knowing the laws of > physics? > I think Russell is referring to a MWI multiverse which is necessarily a quantum computer (we are assuming the wave equation with MWI, so the laws of physics are known). I am not convinced that the MWI + the anthropic principle is equivalent to the subset of the universal dovetailer computations that supports all possible human experiences. I am also not convinced that the set of all possible human experiences is finite. Russell, could you elaborate on these? (I am going to comment on the blog post too, in a rather redundant way) Cheers Telmo. > Is this something to do with Feynman's idea about a QC as something that > could perform exact physical simulations? (if I got that right) > > > On 12 August 2014 11:03, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: > >> I have never got this idea of "counterfactual correctness". It seems to >> be that the argument goes ... >> >> Assume computational process A is conscious >> Take process B, which replays A - B passes through the same machine >> states as A, but it doesn't work them out, it's driven by a recording of A >> - B isn't conscious because it isn't counterfactually correct. >> >> I can't see how this works. (Except insofar as if we assume consciousness >> doesn't supervene on material processes, then neither A nor B is conscious, >> they are just somehow attached to conscious experiences generated >> elsewhere, maybe by a UD.) >> >> >> >> >> On 12 August 2014 09:40, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Got it, thanks. Not too long so I will be able to read it in the near >>> future :-) >>> >>> I hope that is just an honest mistake, Bruno, and no one has been >>> messing with your email deliberately. Do you have another email you can >>> use? (e.g. a GMail one) >>> >>> >>> On 11 August 2014 20:43, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> On 11 Aug 2014, at 06:42, Russell Standish wrote: >>>> >>>> Apologies to everybody. For some reason, when I clicked "publish", >>>>> Wordpress posted an earlier draft of the post, not the most recent one >>>>> I was working on. >>>>> >>>>> I have now restored the correct version of the post - follow the link >>>>> "Draft paper here" to find the paper. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> I got it. I will read it. >>>> >>>> ... >>>> >>>> It looks now, that I have lost the ability to read my mails. Apparently >>>> someone deleted my password at my ULB account. It might take some time >>>> before I can read my mail again. >>>> >>>> Sorry. It is a good thing that I got your text before this happened. I >>>> might soon been unable to send message, too. >>>> >>>> Bruno >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> Cheers >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sun, Aug 10, 2014 at 08:08:55PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 8/10/2014 3:38 PM, Russell Standish wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> As long, long time promised, I now have a draft of my "MGA revisited" >>>>>>> paper for critical comment. I have uploaded this to my blog, which >>>>>>> gives people the ability to attach comments. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> http://www.hpcoders.com.au/blog/?p=73 >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Whilst I'm happy I now understand the issue, I still not happy with >>>>>>> how I've expressed it - the text could still do with some work. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> So let the games begin! >>>>>>> >>>>>>> I went to your blog and I found: >>>>>> >>>>>> /In this paper, we reexamine Bruno Marchal's Movie Graph// >>>>>> //Argument, which demonstrates a basic incompatibility between// >>>>>> //computationalism and materialism. We discover that the >>>>>> incompatibility// >>>>>> //is only manifest in singular classical-like universes. If we >>>>>> accept// >>>>>> //that we live in a Multiverse, then the incompatibility goes away, >>>>>> but// >>>>>> //in that case another line of argument shows that with// >>>>>> //computationalism, fundamental, or primitive materiality has no >>>>>> causal// >>>>>> //influence on what is observed, which must must be derivable from >>>>>> basic// >>>>>> //arithmetic properties./ >>>>>> >>>>>> But I didn't find "this paper"? >>>>>> >>>>>> Brent >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >>>>>> send an email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected] >>>>>> . >>>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ---------------- >>>>> Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) >>>>> Principal, High Performance Coders >>>>> Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] >>>>> University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au >>>>> >>>>> Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret >>>>> (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) >>>>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>>>> ---------------- >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>>> >>>> >>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>> an email to [email protected]. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >>>> >>> >>> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
