On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 06:52:47AM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Le 15 août 2014 06:41, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit :
> >
> > OK.  So do you think consciousness supervenes on such a simple
> computation - one that's functionally identical with a recording?
> 
> I think it does... as it does on a giant lookup table. But as it is in fact
> supervening on *all* computations going through the same states and not on
> this or that precise computation,  it's not a problem.
> 

Hi Quentin, I'm pretty sure it was you who straightened me out on this
topic a bit over a year ago, so it seems surprising you're going
back on this.

The computation supervenenience thesis is that consciousness
supervenes on all counterfactually equivalent computations (to a
particular execution step), which is a more restricted set than those
passing through a given sequence of states.

This allows us to assert that the consciousness does not supervene on
the recording (but will supervene on the huge lookup table, as the
latter is counterfactually correct).

IIRC, Searle's Chinese Room is a huge lookup table. It fails the
intuition pump test because the lookup table would need to be
astronomically vast, not a human sized book as painted in the thought
experiment. 

Cheers

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