On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 10:35 AM, Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]> wrote:
> > Le 15 août 2014 07:29, "Russell Standish" <[email protected]> a écrit > : > > > > > On Fri, Aug 15, 2014 at 06:52:47AM +0200, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > Le 15 août 2014 06:41, "meekerdb" <[email protected]> a écrit : > > > > > > > > OK. So do you think consciousness supervenes on such a simple > > > computation - one that's functionally identical with a recording? > > > > > > I think it does... as it does on a giant lookup table. But as it is in > fact > > > supervening on *all* computations going through the same states and > not on > > > this or that precise computation, it's not a problem. > > > > > > > Hi Quentin, I'm pretty sure it was you who straightened me out on this > > topic a bit over a year ago, so it seems surprising you're going > > back on this. > > > > The computation supervenenience thesis is that consciousness > > supervenes on all counterfactually equivalent computations (to a > > particular execution step) > > It doesn't have to be counterfactually correct to be equivalent up to a > particular step. The thing is that 'recording' have a negligible measure > and as I said, consciousness does not supervenes on *a* particular > computation but on *all* the equivalent one up to step N. Like we could > say in everett that your consciousness state supervenes on all fungible > universes. > Some localizable appearance of Olympias or Klaras does not cause supervenience, which would imply for example that our building and calibration of a Mars rover forces some computation sequence to exist consciously (to some extent), which is upside down, as we suppose that our physical activity and interaction of coding and building the thing causes the supervenience... Instead, I thought the pairing of all computational sequences with some consciousness property (and there can be degrees here, instead of the "all or nothing" extreme which Brent claims Bruno to posit; that's why I'd like to see a reference/quote on that) already exists in more primitive sense. Our construction merely permits it to "exist in a branch accessible to us", I'd say. This is why I have a funny feeling with Russell's version of comp supervenience as it feels excessively local in this regard. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
