On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not
stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined
that "primitive physical".
Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we
don't assume particles, or space, or time, usually
assumed in physical theories.
I know what "primitive" means. The point of the question was what
does "physical" mean. I think it just means stuff we agree on the
3p sense - the dominant invariant measure across 1p experience.
But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are "physical".
The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.
But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.
Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that
assumption. When saying "yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality rich
enough to sustain a doctor, and computers. But we can be neutral on
the nature of that stability, and understand that eventually comp
questions it.
My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and
"observation" mean?
Good question.
with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being
inputed", if I can say. It is when an input "variable", or billions
of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.
A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the button,
find yourself in some box, and open the door. The "read(X) of your
"program" will get instantiated into read(Moscow), or
read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it by
empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted from
reasoning + the local axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a
duplication in W and in M.
The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and
indeed that's why we must hope to find the physical laws as invariant
for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1 complete arithmetical reality.
The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t (or []p & <>p,
that is equivalent in G), with "[]" the name-description of the
machines or of its set of beliefs. An RE set by comp + the fact that
we decide to handle only simple ideal machines.
When one makes an "empirical observation" does one then have
knowledge?
With some luck, as we can be dreaming.
With science, the more we know, less less sure we know that we know.
The more our beliefs became stable, the less we can justify them.
The opening of the eyes does not reveal the truth, it only enlarge the
spectrum of the possible, and you get more doubts, unless you lie to
yourself. But you can find theoretical pearls, that is assumption
which makes you move forward, in a more complex and rich reality, for
the best, or the worst (depending partially on you).
All this *in* the computationalist theory. (I mean that I am not
asserting truth, but describing what machines believing in
computationalism can say).
Bruno
Brent
"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on
object that we can detect empirically, like particles, forces,
waves, space, time, temperature, etc.
Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They
might assume 0, and its successor, but you don't need a laboratory,
nor any *observation* to believe in them, a priori.
Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it
includes arithmetical, but that would makes more confusing the
comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic, that is, derive
the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete
theory (with comp in the background).
Bruno
Brent
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