On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not stuff - but then I
don't think "stuff" is any better defined that "primitive physical".
Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we don't assume
particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in physical theories.
I know what "primitive" means. The point of the question was what does "physical"
mean. I think it just means stuff we agree on the 3p sense - the dominant invariant
measure across 1p experience. But by that definition numbers and arithmetic are
"physical".
The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.
But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.
Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that assumption. When saying
"yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality rich enough to sustain a doctor, and
computers. But we can be neutral on the nature of that stability, and understand that
eventually comp questions it.
My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and "observation"
mean?
Good question.
with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being inputed", if I can say.
It is when an input "variable", or billions of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.
OK. That implies some boundary between "in" and "out", some persistent meaning of
"inside".
A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the button, find yourself in
some box, and open the door. The "read(X) of your "program" will get instantiated into
read(Moscow), or read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it by
empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted from reasoning + the local
axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a duplication in W and in M.
The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and indeed that's why we
must hope to find the physical laws as invariant for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1
complete arithmetical reality.
I think "invariant" in that context means the same as Stenger's point-of-view-invariance.
But what seems to be invariant are the probabilities of Born's rule. What I'm trying to
see is whether CTM can shed any light on the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
Naively, it seems to imply the many-minds interpretation: invariance relative to
"observers". But physicists who propose this view take "mind" to a primitive, which CTM
does not. Under CTM the computers at CERN may be plenty mindful enough to have a viewpoint.
The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t
That's supposed to formalize Prob(p)=1?? I can understand []p & <>p, but I don't see how
<>t (there is some world that contains a true proposition?) model Prob(p)=1.
Brent
(or []p & <>p, that is equivalent in G), with "[]" the name-description of the machines
or of its set of beliefs. An RE set by comp + the fact that we decide to handle only
simple ideal machines.
When one makes an "empirical observation" does one then have knowledge?
With some luck, as we can be dreaming.
With science, the more we know, less less sure we know that we know. The more our
beliefs became stable, the less we can justify them.
The opening of the eyes does not reveal the truth, it only enlarge the spectrum of the
possible, and you get more doubts, unless you lie to yourself. But you can find
theoretical pearls, that is assumption which makes you move forward, in a more complex
and rich reality, for the best, or the worst (depending partially on you).
All this *in* the computationalist theory. (I mean that I am not asserting truth, but
describing what machines believing in computationalism can say).
Bruno
Brent
"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on object that we can
detect empirically, like particles, forces, waves, space, time, temperature, etc.
Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They might assume 0, and
its successor, but you don't need a laboratory, nor any *observation* to believe in
them, a priori.
Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it includes arithmetical, but
that would makes more confusing the comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic,
that is, derive the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete
theory (with comp in the background).
Bruno
Brent
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