On 22 Aug 2014, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 11:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 22 Aug 2014, at 18:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/22/2014 2:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2014, at 18:33, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/21/2014 12:49 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
They could be the ur-stuff of a TOE. Bruno says they're not
stuff - but then I don't think "stuff" is any better defined
that "primitive physical".
Primitive means "assumed necessarily in the TOE. With comp we
don't assume particles, or space, or time, usually assumed in
physical theories.
I know what "primitive" means. The point of the question was
what does "physical" mean. I think it just means stuff we agree
on the 3p sense - the dominant invariant
measure across 1p experience. But by that definition numbers
and arithmetic are "physical".
The physical is concerned with the empirically observable.
But "empirically observable" assumes a sharable world.
Well, not from a logical point of view. But I grant you that
assumption. When saying "yes" to the doctor, se suppose a reality
rich enough to sustain a doctor, and computers. But we can be
neutral on the nature of that stability, and understand that
eventually comp questions it.
My question is what, within your theory, does "empirical" and
"observation" mean?
Good question.
with comp, roughly speaking, empirical means "obtained by being
inputed", if I can say. It is when an input "variable", or
billions of such, get instantiated, or are instantiated.
OK. That implies some boundary between "in" and "out", some
persistent meaning of "inside".
A paradigmatic example is when you where in Helsinki, push the
button, find yourself in some box, and open the door. The "read(X)
of your "program" will get instantiated into read(Moscow), or
read(Washington). That is an example of observation, and you get it
by empirical means (as opposed to the "W v M" that you predicted
from reasoning + the local axiom I am in helsinki and will endure a
duplication in W and in M.
The FPI on the UD* gives the whole possible empirical spectrum, and
indeed that's why we must hope to find the physical laws as
invariant for the machine's FPI on the sigma_1 complete
arithmetical reality.
I think "invariant" in that context means the same as Stenger's
point-of-view-invariance.
I agree it is the same invariant, except that Stenger is neutral on
"1p, 1p-plural, or 3p). But OK. The context is a bit different, as
Tenger assume a physical realitu obeying QM, and I assume comp.
But what seems to be invariant are the probabilities of Born's
rule. What I'm trying to see is whether CTM can shed any light on
the measurement problem of quantum mechanics.
It leads to Everett, normally, or at least to that sort of explanation.
Naively, it seems to imply the many-minds interpretation: invariance
relative to "observers".
"Many-Mind" is unclear to me. I read Albert and Loewer, and I am not
convinced, although there are some similarities. Again Albert & Loewer
assume SWE, and I do not. I assume only the addition and
multiplication laws of non negative integers: 0, its successor, its
successor's successor, etc.
But physicists who propose this view take "mind" to a primitive,
which CTM does not. Under CTM the computers at CERN may be plenty
mindful enough to have a viewpoint.
I doubt we let them instropecting, or developping viewpoints. They are
slaves, with strong blinders. It is normal, they don't want computers
asking social security and doing strike :)
The "probability one" is then formalized by []p & <>t
That's supposed to formalize Prob(p)=1?? I can understand []p &
<>p, but I don't see how <>t (there is some world that contains a
true proposition?) model Prob(p)=1.
Thanks to incompleteness, <>t -> <>[]f, so imagine that you are in
world alpha, and <>t is true there. it means that there is a world
beta accessible from alpha, where you are are, in which []f is true,
but this can only means that beta is a cul-de-sac world. Well, imagine
you "arrive" in that cul-de-sac world. Now []f is true. But f-
><anything>, #, is true, and thus [](f->#), which by Kripke formula
entails []f -> []#, and so []#. So anything would have probability
one, if [] was used for the probability. So, to get a "probability",
incompleteness asks for making explicit the demand of consistency
(which is equivalent in the Kripke semantics, with "I am not in a no
cul-de-sac world". You get then natural idea that P(A) = 1, means that
A is true in all worlds you can accede, and this assuming explicitly
that there is at least one world accessible (<>t).
Likewise, incompleteness ask for knowledge, the explicit assumption
that what is proved (believed) is true, []p & p, as we don't have in
general that []p -> p in the machine's talk (despite G* knows that we
do have this, but the machine can't know that).
OK?
Bruno
PS From tomorrow to the end of week, I have a lot of professional
duties. Expect possible delays in comments. Thanks for the patience.
Brent
(or []p & <>p, that is equivalent in G), with "[]" the name-
description of the machines or of its set of beliefs. An RE set by
comp + the fact that we decide to handle only simple ideal machines.
When one makes an "empirical observation" does one then have
knowledge?
With some luck, as we can be dreaming.
With science, the more we know, less less sure we know that we
know. The more our beliefs became stable, the less we can justify
them.
The opening of the eyes does not reveal the truth, it only enlarge
the spectrum of the possible, and you get more doubts, unless you
lie to yourself. But you can find theoretical pearls, that is
assumption which makes you move forward, in a more complex and rich
reality, for the best, or the worst (depending partially on you).
All this *in* the computationalist theory. (I mean that I am not
asserting truth, but describing what machines believing in
computationalism can say).
Bruno
Brent
"primitive physical" means that we assume primitive observable on
object that we can detect empirically, like particles, forces,
waves, space, time, temperature, etc.
Theories about numbers do not assume any physical objects. They
might assume 0, and its successor, but you don't need a
laboratory, nor any *observation* to believe in them, a priori.
Of course, you can extend the sense of physical, so that it
includes arithmetical, but that would makes more confusing the
comp necessity to derive physics from arithmetic, that is, derive
the observable from what we can justify from any Turing complete
theory (with comp in the background).
Bruno
Brent
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