Ok. Have you ever given thought to a primal mind being a Boltzmann Brain?
-----Original Message----- From: David Nyman <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Tue, Oct 14, 2014 11:21 am Subject: Re: Are We Really Conscious? (NYT Article today) On 14 October 2014 11:49, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: They eliminate consciousness because they grasp that it is the only way to keep the aristotelian belief in a creation intact. I seem to be motivated to comment at some length on this topic! It must be because of what I've been reading and thinking about recently. Graziano writes, in an attempt to justify, in evolutionary terms, how the brain might come to "believe" (incorrectly) that it is subjectively aware: "...my colleagues and I have been developing the “attention schema” theory of consciousness, which may explain why that computation is useful and would evolve in any complex brain. Here’s the gist of it: Take again the case of color and wavelength. Wavelength is a real, physical phenomenon; color is the brain’s approximate, slightly incorrect model of it. In the attention schema theory, attention is the physical phenomenon and awareness is the brain’s approximate, slightly incorrect model of it. In neuroscience, attention is a process of enhancing some signals at the expense of others. It’s a way of focusing resources. Attention: a real, mechanistic phenomenon that can be programmed into a computer chip. Awareness: a cartoonish reconstruction of attention that is as physically inaccurate as the brain’s internal model of color." He's quite explicit here about the primacy of physical brain-based explanation. But he also appeals to computation within this brain-first explanatory schema, as in his distinction between wavelength as a "real, physical phenomenon" and color as an approximate "model" of it. The problem for this style of explanation is that, in terms of his explicit schema, any "software" model is entirely reducible to primary brain "hardware". The "real, physical phenomena" of the brain are fundamental and hence only physical phenomena are accessible as objects of selection in any evolutionary account, assuming physical primacy. This distinction vitiates any attempt to justify the differential selection of any particular "software" organisation since any such selection must already be fully accounted for on the basis of "real, physical phenomena". IOW, it actually provides no non-question-begging explanation of why there would be any selective advantage for either "attention" or "awareness" per se in this schema, as both would be equally subsumed in their "real" physical implementation. Neither account could be more than an a posteriori re-description of what had already been selected in the "real, physical" regime, on the basis of purely "hardware" criteria. Properly understood, such "soft" concepts must be seen as explanatorily redundant - as you imply - if material explanation is accepted as primary. In short: If Aristotle were right, there would be no need of dreams to explain why there were machines. But if Plato is right, then we need machines to explain why we are dreaming. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
