On 12 Nov 2014, at 16:10, Peter Sas wrote:

Does anybody know this paper: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S221268641300037X

It is pleasant to read, but I will wait what others can add, if it is really more than a variant of the vacuum fluctuation approach.

It cannot satisfy a theorician of mind, who assumes the computationalist hypothesis, because it assumes:

1) the quantum description of the physical reality,
2) a primary physical reality.

If you read the beginning of the sane04 paper, you should understand (hopefully) that if we assume that the brain is Turing emulable, then basically "2)" is false (or epistemologically inconsistent), and "1) must be retrieved from arithmetic (or any first order logical sigma_1 complete (Turing universal) theory).



And is it any good?

It was pleasant for me. I have not the time to study it and say more. I might have missed many things. But he assumes Hilbert spaces, and that is a lot, so the "ex nihilo" terming refers already to a quite rich mathematical object. Computationalism explains that we have to find that object in our head, or in the "head' of any turing universal machine or sigma_1 complete believer.

What he missed most from a fundamental perspective is the 1p/3p distinction, and the problem of their relations (the mind-body problem, if you want). But then he is not alone, and the subject is still a bit taboo since the closure of Plato Academy at about +500 after JC.

Bruno




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