On 07 Dec 2014, at 02:24, LizR wrote:
On 5 December 2014 at 20:06, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from
primary existence.
What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic
case? the example we point to when asked to define "exits"?
Having been on this list for a while, you should know the
difference. It may be that they are the same thing, or it may not.
The jury is still out.
... because the jury is still out for the truth of computationalism
(and this will remain true, strictly speaking, for ever). But if we
assume computationalism, then physical existence and arithmetical or
mathematical existence are provably different, and the physical is
given by a first person plural modality. Then accepting the ancient
treatment of knowledge, that Gödel redeems through the intensional
variants of provability this becomes testable, and partially tested.
If the quanta appeared in Z1 or X1, instead of Z1* and X1*, it would
have been meaningful to make the physical reality more independent of
the machine's mind, but they appear in the starred logic (+ in S4Grz1*
= S4Grz1), making the quanta into particular qualia, and physics is
more idealistic than I thought myself before I saw this.
Computationalism favors Everett, but without neglecting so much those
who consider the quantum amplitude as describing knowledge states. Too
much for my taste, but wishful thinking is inoperative here. Pauli and
Christopher Fuchs are less wrong that I would be inclined to believe
from my physical intuition.
Bruno
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