On 06 Dec 2014, at 14:09, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 05 Dec 2014, at 17:20, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:06 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from
primary existence.
What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic
case? the example we point to when asked to define "exits"?
Not wanting to bypass Bruno's more sophisticated explanations, I
tend to equate "physical existence" with the idea of something
existing independently of an observer. Or, to put it another way,
taking 3p reality seriously. No?
Unfortunately, if we assume computationalism, the physical is no
more 3p, but is 1p-plural, which makes the FPI locally 3p, but still
globally 1p-plural. But that 1p-plural here is not the human 1p, but
the 3p definable "1p-plural" use the 1p of the Löbian machine, which
is very general, and admits a 3p definition, like []p & <>t, which
is definable by the machine unlike the modalities with " & p" added
to it.
I guess I will need to explain this a bit more perhaps. You forget
the "reversal" physics/machine-theology/psychology. In case of
panic, note that the moon would still exist physically even if the
humans did not appear. But there would be no moon without Löbian
machines, which is not a problem because the existence of Löbian
machines is derivable in elementary arithmetic. It is a consequence
of 2+2=4.
cf: NUMBER => MACHINE'S DREAM => PHYSICAL REALITIES
Thanks Bruno. I have no problem with this.
I was referring to "physical existence" in the conventional
materialistic sense.
OK. 1p-plural is certainly locally 3p-physical, in the conventionall
sense. If computationalism is correct, it has to be like that.
In your model the physical reality has a much different ontological
status than in materialism, even though, as you say, the outcome is
the same for many purposes.
That remains to be seen, but the first very modest result confirms
this, at a place most thought it would not.
On the other side: the contagion of superposition to the observer
states gives an empirical confirmation of the "natural" appearance of
1p plural person (with duplication or n-plication of *population* of
interacting observers). It is less obvious with computationalism, but
far from totally hopeless though.
Maybe we lack terms. But, also to reply to Brent, this idea of 1p-
plural is perhaps why one can doubt 3p reality and still avoid the
mad house.
We still have the 3p basic ontology of the chosenTOE also (like
numbers or combinators). I mean to avoid the asylum ...
Bruno
Telmo.
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
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