On Sat, Dec 6, 2014 at 9:14 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > On 05 Dec 2014, at 17:20, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > > > On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:06 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote: >> >>> I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from primary >>> existence. >>> >> >> What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic case? >> the example we point to when asked to define "exits"? >> > > Not wanting to bypass Bruno's more sophisticated explanations, I tend to > equate "physical existence" with the idea of something existing > independently of an observer. Or, to put it another way, taking 3p reality > seriously. No? > > > Unfortunately, if we assume computationalism, the physical is no more 3p, > but is 1p-plural, which makes the FPI locally 3p, but still globally > 1p-plural. But that 1p-plural here is not the human 1p, but the 3p > definable "1p-plural" use the 1p of the Löbian machine, which is very > general, and admits a 3p definition, like []p & <>t, which is definable by > the machine unlike the modalities with " & p" added to it. > > I guess I will need to explain this a bit more perhaps. You forget the > "reversal" physics/machine-theology/psychology. In case of panic, note that > the moon would still exist physically even if the humans did not appear. > But there would be no moon without Löbian machines, which is not a problem > because the existence of Löbian machines is derivable in elementary > arithmetic. It is a consequence of 2+2=4. > > cf: NUMBER => MACHINE'S DREAM => PHYSICAL REALITIES > Thanks Bruno. I have no problem with this. I was referring to "physical existence" in the conventional materialistic sense. In your model the physical reality has a much different ontological status than in materialism, even though, as you say, the outcome is the same for many purposes. Maybe we lack terms. But, also to reply to Brent, this idea of 1p-plural is perhaps why one can doubt 3p reality and still avoid the mad house. Telmo. > > Bruno > > > > > Telmo. > > >> >> Brent >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
