On 05 Dec 2014, at 17:20, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 8:06 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 12/4/2014 8:05 PM, LizR wrote:
I suspect that Bruno is differentiating physical existence from
primary existence.
What's the difference? Isn't physical existence the paradigmatic
case? the example we point to when asked to define "exits"?
Not wanting to bypass Bruno's more sophisticated explanations, I
tend to equate "physical existence" with the idea of something
existing independently of an observer. Or, to put it another way,
taking 3p reality seriously. No?
Unfortunately, if we assume computationalism, the physical is no more
3p, but is 1p-plural, which makes the FPI locally 3p, but still
globally 1p-plural. But that 1p-plural here is not the human 1p, but
the 3p definable "1p-plural" use the 1p of the Löbian machine, which
is very general, and admits a 3p definition, like []p & <>t, which is
definable by the machine unlike the modalities with " & p" added to it.
I guess I will need to explain this a bit more perhaps. You forget the
"reversal" physics/machine-theology/psychology. In case of panic, note
that the moon would still exist physically even if the humans did not
appear. But there would be no moon without Löbian machines, which is
not a problem because the existence of Löbian machines is derivable in
elementary arithmetic. It is a consequence of 2+2=4.
cf: NUMBER => MACHINE'S DREAM => PHYSICAL REALITIES
Bruno
Telmo.
Brent
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