From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Wednesday, January 07, 2015 3:42 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to 
dialectics?

 

 

On 07 Jan 2015, at 08:41, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:





 

 

From: [email protected] 
[mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of Bruno Marchal
Sent: Tuesday, January 06, 2015 2:00 AM
To: [email protected]
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to 
dialectics?

 

 

On 04 Jan 2015, at 08:07, 'Roger' via Everything List wrote:






In regard to:

"If nothing existed; would it remain nothing?"

This is exactly what I'm suggesting.  It would not remain "nothing".  We 
usually think of the situation when you get rid of all matter, energy, 
space/volume, time, abstract concepts, minds, etc. as "nothing".  But, what I'm 
saying is that this supposed "nothing" really isn't the lack of all existent 
entities.  That "nothing" would be the entirety of all that is present; that's 
it; there's nothing else.  It would be the all.  An entirety is a grouping 
defining what is contained within and therefore an existent entity, based on my 
definition of an existent entity.  

 

Your set comprehension axiom. You are working in some set theory, which is 
provably too much in case you assume brain works without magic 
(computationalism).

 

 






So, even what we think of as "nothing" is an existent entity or "something". 

 

If only through the "we" which think about that nothing. 

 

Is anything possible at all without an observer?

 

 

In principle yes. The arithmetical reality is supposed to exist/make sense 
without any external observer (except God if you take it as a person, but that 
would be confusing).

 

Perhaps observer is too strong of a concept; so let me use a somewhat weaker 
concept. Is anything possible without assuming perspective – or if you prefer 
point of view -- (which implicitly suggests the existence of an observer 
holding that perspective or POV)? 

 

Then physical observation is defined by the relation between numbers, and at 
that level, you can say, or not (depending on different definition) that the 
physical exist only through the observers. But be careful because this does not 
make disappear far away planet without any observer on them. You can still say 
that such realities depend on the observers, just not the human one, but the 
entire range of possible observers which exists by the infinities of 
arithmetical relations which involve them.

 

What about much weaker meanings of observer than conscious self-aware observer. 
I am thinking of observer in the sense of anything that is capable of 
performing a quantum measurement. And if we are dealing in pure conceptual 
entities then a conceptual entity capable of having a perspective on another 
entity. 

 

Computationalism can be considered as an objective idealism. It needs 
(immaterial) number relations, but not necessarily a starting person or mind. 

 

However these hypothesized numeric entities – in their own relations, must per 
force be “aware” of each other… in some sense. Not in some anthropomorphic 
sense of being self-aware human like observers. Aren’t concepts, such as 
entanglement and perspective needed in order for the whole system to function?

-Chris

 

Nevertheless, for the physical reality, you need a reasoner (given by Gödel's 
[]p), a knower (given by []p & p), a better ([]p & <>t), and a feeler ([]p & 
<>t & p). Computationalism is itself obtained internally by restricting the 
arithmetical interpretation of the propositional letters to the sigma_1 
sentences, which have the shape ExP(x), with P decidable, as they models the 
computations (they even emulate them, with Church's thesis).

 

Then, the advantage, is that we inherit the proof/truth splitting in two of the 
logic of self-reference, which helps for the qualia and the proper theological 
internal aspect of the arithmetical reality.

 

I hope this helps, but some good books on logic can help also, like Mendelson, 
or Boolos-Jeffrey-Burgess books.

 

Bruno

 

 

 

 

 





-Chris

 

 






This means that "something" is non-contingent.  It's necessary.  There is no 
such thing as the lack of all existent entities.

 

 

It is necessary for having an observer, or a dreamer, conceiving nothing, but 
then you assume "we", which usually is among what we would like to explain the 
existence. In all case we have to do some assumption, notably about the thing 
we talk about before deciding if they exist or not.

 

Like computationalism offers the best we can hope for the mind-body problem, I 
think it does the same for the question of this thread. It is a bit frustrating 
in the sense that it shows that there are minimal thing that we will never 
explain the origin of (like the "basic" Turing universal system).

 

Bruno

 







On Saturday, January 3, 2015 1:17:27 AM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:

 

 

From: [email protected] <javascript:>  
[mailto:[email protected] <javascript:> ] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, January 02, 2015 9:44 PM
To: [email protected] <javascript:> 
Subject: Re: Why is there something rather than nothing? From quantum theory to 
dialectics?

 

On 1/2/2015 9:05 PM, 'Roger' via Everything List wrote:

Even if the word "exists" has no use because everything exists, it seems 
important to know why everything exists.  How is it that a thing can exist?  
What I suggest is that a grouping defining what is contained within is an 
existent entity.  Then, you can use this to try and answer the other question 
of "Why is there something rather than nothing?".


If everything exists, what doesn't exist?  Nothing.

 

If nothing existed; would it remain nothing?

-Chris

Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

 

 

 

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