On 14 Jan 2015, at 08:38, meekerdb wrote:

On 1/13/2015 11:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 8:29 PM, John Clark <[email protected]> wrote:

On Mon, Jan 12, 2015 at 5:04 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote:

>> O'Brien knew that who controls language controls thought. So peace is war. Atheism is Christianity. And "God" is whatever you want it to mean.

> Bruno has a specific definition of God,

He says he does, but when you probe a little deeper you find that he does not. In fact he has specifically said and I quote " This is useful to realize that the question "is god a person or a thing" is an open problem.". So when Bruno talks about "God" he quite literately and by his own admission doesn't know what he's talking about.


So I take it number theorists have no idea what they're talking about either, because the Goldbach conjecture is still an open problem in their field.

Number theorists have a precise definition of the Goldbach conjecture and they have some axioms and rules of inference. So their uncertainty is mainly whether one leads to the other. However, it might turn out that they don't know what they're talking about; it might turn out that the Goldbach conjecture is undecidable and that it can be added as an axiom or it's negation can be added as an axiom.

Goldbach conjecture is Pi_1, so if false, it is refutable. The negation of Goldbach (NGC) is Sigma_1 and thus semi-decidable. So if NGC is true, it can be proved: just by showing the counter-example. (If an even number is not the sum of two primes, this can be verified in a finite time, and you cannot add the negation of GC as a new axioms, without being led to an inconsistency).

But God is different: I defined it by the reality at the origin of consciousness and matter, or consciousness and matter appearances.

You can define God by what exists when you stop believing in primary matter. For machine, reality or truth is theological in the sense that the machine can believe in it, but cannot justify its existence, nor can the machine give a description of what it is, only approximations, each differing fundamentally from what it can be. But if you don't like the term "god", use any vague term you want. Don't use a precise term, like physical reality, or arithmetical reality, because that would be part of a possible answer that we look for. I define God by the thing at the origin of matter and consciousness, and then *assuming comp* I show that the arithmetical reality play that role, and is the only thing capable of playing that role, but at the start, I was open that it might be a physical universe: or even a abramanic god, but this does not work, and so we derive God from our assumption of computationalism.

To be sure, there is still room for a more abramanic-like notion of God in computationalism, but then we can show that no machine could ever distinguish it from the arithmetical truth (and so I drop this nuance, at this stage).

The advantage of using that general definition of God, is that we can compare the theology of the (ideally correct) machine with all human theologies. For example, the theology of the atheists, with 0 personal god, and one impersonal God (the material universe), just does not work. At the opposite, the God of the Parmenides, the atemporal ONE, seems quite close to the ONE of the machine (arithmetical truth). That is another advantage of terms like god and theology, it shows that the greeks and Indian developed an intuition comparable to the intuition that the self-observing machine develops. it shows that greek theology was closer to what science teach us today than we might have thought.

With some scientists, I got early problem, not by using God, but just by using "mind", or "consciousness" or even "artificial intelligence", or "computer" (sic) or "quantum" (re-sic).

I really don't understand why you have a problem with defining God by the whatever is at the logical/causal origin of all possible beliefs and knowledge (including matter and consciousness).

It is the only way to be as much neutral as possible at the start on all religions (including the belief in matter). Then we use reason and hypotheses only, so we don't need to even address the question of the fairy tales: in science we don't take historical witnessing as valid in physical and metaphysical explanations. We accept only clear theories with clear means of testing them (available or not with current theology: string theory and comp are testable in that sense).

Bruno



Brent

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