On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 5:28 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 4 February 2015 at 10:13, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 4:55 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > > wrote: > >> > >> On 4 February 2015 at 09:26, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > > >> > > >> > On Tue, Feb 3, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Stathis Papaioannou < > [email protected]> > >> > wrote: > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On Wednesday, February 4, 2015, Jason Resch <[email protected]> > >> >> wrote: > >> >>> > >> >>> I agree with John. If consciousness had no third-person observable > >> >>> effects, it would be an epiphenomenon. And then there is no way to > >> >>> explain > >> >>> why we're even having this discussion about consciousness. > >> >> > >> >> > >> >> On the contrary, if consciousness were an epiphenomenon that would > >> >> explain > >> >> why it evolved: it is a necessary side effect of intelligent > behaviour, > >> >> and > >> >> was not developed as a separate, useless add-on. > >> >> > >> > > >> > > >> > If consciousness is a side-effect that has no other effects, then > where > >> > is > >> > the information coming from when a person articulates something about > >> > their > >> > conscious experience? If consciousness itself has no effects at all, > >> > then > >> > how did the theory of epiphenomenalism come to be shared beyond the > >> > conscious mind that first conceived of it? Wouldn't such a theory > >> > necessarily be private and unsharable if consciousness has no effects? > >> > >> My position is that if physics is causally closed, then ipso facto > >> consciousness is epiphenomenal. Otherwise, you would be able to devise > >> a test to determine if a given system is conscious. > > > > > > Why do you presume such a test is not possible? > > > > Jason > > Could you suggest one? We could test other people, animals, computers, > thermostats... > I don't know of one but I don't take that to mean no such test can exist, especially when that assumption leads to things I find less plausible than consciousness tests, such as epiphenomenalism. I do follow what your reasoning that (no possible test for consciousness) -> (epiphenominalism), but I use that reasoning to take the position that (*not *epiphenominalism) -> (*not *no possible test for consciousness). Hence there should be a test for consciousness under the assumption that epiphenomenalism is false. (Which it seems to be because we can talk about consciousness, also thought experiments like dancing/fading qualia lend further support to consciousness being detectible and having detectible influences on behavior, see: http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html ). Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
