On 5 February 2015 at 21:42, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: This looks like dualism in name only to me. The "mental" is just a > different model of the same process modeled physically. Just as > thermodynamics is different model for statistical mechanics.
But you're not describing epiphenomenalism here. AFAICS this is either eliminativism (i.e. the "mental" as a category is simply a re-description of the physical) or some other species of identity theory. I confess I've never been able to make sense of this, but in any case there's no dualism because in the final analysis everything is supposed to be 'just physical'. If that were all there were to epiphenomenalism there would be no point in distinguishing it from these positions. But in fact epiphenomenalism differentiates two distinct phenomena, only one of which is physical. The 'epi' signifies causal impotence, not categorical elimination. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
