On 6 February 2015 at 01:01, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: You seem intent on defining terms in order to dimiss them. For example, > why is taking "mental" to be re-description of the physical > "elimininativism"? Does it eliminate the physical or the mental - or > neither. If I describe heat as the average energy per degree of freedom do > you think I've eliminated heat? >
I'm sorry, but you don't seem to accept the generally understood sense of eliminativism here. We're not talking about the validity of one or another re-description, or mathematical model. In purely third-person terms, of course, one model can be as valid or useful as another, depending on the purpose for which it is deployed. But what is at issue here is first-person reality, actuality or truth. which cannot be similarly negotiated away in purely third-person terms. If that reality is defined in its entirety as an alternative mathematical model imposed on a primary ontology, it becomes *eliminable*, in the sense of being functionally replaceable by some alternative re-description. This principle is perfectly obvious in terms of any reductive hierarchy, for example in the case you quote above. > You seem to have a reflex so that any mention of something physical > triggers a response that the mental is being denied, eliminated, and not > properly honored and that someone is claiming "everything is just physical" > - even though it's been noted that "physical" is not very well defined. > I'd like you to understand that I'm not saying that 'someone is claiming' any such thing explicitly (although they might be). Rather I'm trying to make explicit the implicit concealment of such a claim in the use of particular assumptions and derivations. > Essentially the question seems to boil down, "Can there be an account of > sequences of thoughts that can be shared?" We all know there are > explanations in terms of prior ideas, memories, desires. Why should there > not also be explanations of the same thing in terms of neurons, hormones, > and senses? > I think you're caricaturing my position. But to answer your question, of course there can be neurological explanations, but they' won't *in themselves* be mental explanations, although they can (hopefully) be associated with them and in that sense shared. I think the nub of our dispute is that I'm dissatisfied with leaving it at that. Your response is generally to tell me not to expect explanation to be capable of taking any other form or going any further. ISTM that Bruno's ideas, regardless of whether they ultimately pan out, indicate that this isn't necessarily the case. But in the beginning it may just require a bit more effort of the imagination. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
