On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 8:54 AM, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> > wrote: > > On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote: >> > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou <stath...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> > >> >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. >> >> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it >> >> did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way, >> >> does not imply that consciousness does not exist or is unimportant. >> >> >> >> The parallel examples I would give are emergent phenomena such as the >> >> economy. You might say this is not the same thing because it is >> >> somehow obvious that the economy is "just" the behaviour of its >> >> component parts while this is not obvious for the brain and mind. This >> >> may be a valid point, but what is its significance, in the end? >> > >> > >> > Well, you still haven't addressed the reference issue (you didn't the >> last >> > time I asked you either). On the face of it, your position would appear >> to >> > be that there is no such reference; i.e. that everything is indeed >> 'just' >> > the behaviour of its component parts, whatever we suppose those to be. >> But >> > if so, what are we talking about? Indeed, in what sense are we even >> talking >> > at all? >> >> What if it could be shown that consciousness necessarily supervenes on >> certain types of functional organisations, realised in any substrate, >> in any universe, under any physics? Would you still consider there was >> a reference problem? >> > > My position essentially is that the reference issue is an artefact of a > false construction of the problem area. It arises whenever consciousness is > relegated to the role of a brute (because unexplained and a posteriori) > add-on or accompaniment to a causally-independent primary physical > ontology. This in effect gives rise to a form of implicit dualism that > leads more or less directly to such absurdities as philosophical zombies. > Describing consciousness as an 'epiphenomenon' of physics tends to this > kind of error, IMO. > > I think this is very well put. Epiphenominalism doesn't mean supervienience or emergence, it is a form of dualism, as shown here: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DualismCausationViews3.svg Jason > The alternative, ISTM, lies in an explication of the proper relation > between an assumed ontology and its epistemological consequences. The value > of Bruno's schema is in suggesting how this could work, at least in outline > and in principle, assuming computationalism. > > >> > In this regard, your analogy to the economy is indeed inapt, because it >> begs >> > the very question at issue. Notions such as the economy are, after all, >> > 'emergent' only under some interpretation. Absent such interpretation >> (which >> > is the very point in question) there would be (as you acknowledge) no >> need >> > to invoke such notions in any reductive account. >> >> Perhaps we could say that consciousness "emerges" as such under its >> own interpretation, creating as it were its own observer. >> > > To be frank, Stathis, I'm a little frustrated that you don't seem to read, > or at least respond to, what I've written. I did indeed go on to say more > or less what you suggest above, but with the rather considerable caveat > that an understanding (as opposed to brute a posteriori acceptance) of how > this could work may well require a radically different TOE. > > David > > >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
