On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 8:54 AM, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 5 February 2015 at 13:35, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> > wrote: > > On 4 February 2015 at 12:49, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: >> > On 3 February 2015 at 23:11, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > >> >> An epiphenomenon is a necessary side-effect of the primary phenomenon. >> >> The epiphenomenon has no separate causal efficacy of its own; if it >> >> did, then we could devise a test for consciousness. This, by the way, >> >> does not imply that consciousness does not exist or is unimportant. >> >> >> >> The parallel examples I would give are emergent phenomena such as the >> >> economy. You might say this is not the same thing because it is >> >> somehow obvious that the economy is "just" the behaviour of its >> >> component parts while this is not obvious for the brain and mind. This >> >> may be a valid point, but what is its significance, in the end? >> > >> > >> > Well, you still haven't addressed the reference issue (you didn't the >> last >> > time I asked you either). On the face of it, your position would appear >> to >> > be that there is no such reference; i.e. that everything is indeed >> 'just' >> > the behaviour of its component parts, whatever we suppose those to be. >> But >> > if so, what are we talking about? Indeed, in what sense are we even >> talking >> > at all? >> >> What if it could be shown that consciousness necessarily supervenes on >> certain types of functional organisations, realised in any substrate, >> in any universe, under any physics? Would you still consider there was >> a reference problem? >> > > My position essentially is that the reference issue is an artefact of a > false construction of the problem area. It arises whenever consciousness is > relegated to the role of a brute (because unexplained and a posteriori) > add-on or accompaniment to a causally-independent primary physical > ontology. This in effect gives rise to a form of implicit dualism that > leads more or less directly to such absurdities as philosophical zombies. > Describing consciousness as an 'epiphenomenon' of physics tends to this > kind of error, IMO. > > I think this is very well put. Epiphenominalism doesn't mean supervienience or emergence, it is a form of dualism, as shown here: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:DualismCausationViews3.svg Jason > The alternative, ISTM, lies in an explication of the proper relation > between an assumed ontology and its epistemological consequences. The value > of Bruno's schema is in suggesting how this could work, at least in outline > and in principle, assuming computationalism. > > >> > In this regard, your analogy to the economy is indeed inapt, because it >> begs >> > the very question at issue. Notions such as the economy are, after all, >> > 'emergent' only under some interpretation. Absent such interpretation >> (which >> > is the very point in question) there would be (as you acknowledge) no >> need >> > to invoke such notions in any reductive account. >> >> Perhaps we could say that consciousness "emerges" as such under its >> own interpretation, creating as it were its own observer. >> > > To be frank, Stathis, I'm a little frustrated that you don't seem to read, > or at least respond to, what I've written. I did indeed go on to say more > or less what you suggest above, but with the rather considerable caveat > that an understanding (as opposed to brute a posteriori acceptance) of how > this could work may well require a radically different TOE. > > David > > >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an >> email to [email protected]. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
