On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >> On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> >>>> If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain >>>>>> being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. >>>>>> But this cannot be used to show that consciousness exists either >>>>>> generally or in a particular case. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Okay but I fail to see the connection of this statement to the one I >>>>> made >>>>> above. >>>>> >>>> The relevance is that I'm not saying that consciousness results in >>>> physically detectable differences in behaviour, even though I am >>>> saying that a certain type of behaviour may necessarily be associated >>>> with consciousness. It's a bit subtle - it might seem contradictory at >>>> first glance. >>>> >>>> I invoke Chalmers' >>>>>>>> fading qualia argument, which shows that if consciousness were >>>>>>>> contingent rather than necessary it would be possible to make >>>>>>>> partial >>>>>>>> zombies. Partial zombies are absurd; if they are not absurd then we >>>>>>>> may as well say consciousness does not exist. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>>> If partial zombies are absurd, then so are full zombies. >>>>>>> Epiphenominalism >>>>>>> makes full zombies logically (if not physically by your definition) >>>>>>> possible. Therefore I also find epihpenominalism absurd as the idea >>>>>>> of >>>>>>> partial zombies. >>>>>>> >>>>>> I agree that full zombies are also absurd. There is a potential >>>>>> problem here with the terms "absurd", "physically possible", >>>>>> "logically possible", "conceptually possible". I think zombies are >>>>>> conceptually possible, but I think they are logically impossible. I >>>>>> don't see why you say epiphenomenalism (as opposed to some other >>>>>> theory?) makes zombies logically possible. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Epihpenominalism makes zombies not only logically possible, but >>>>> physically >>>>> undetectable (because consciousness is presumed to have no effects, so >>>>> whether it is present or not can never be ascertained). Under >>>>> epihpenominalism, no physical text, measurement, or experiment, could >>>>> ever >>>>> detect the presence of consciousness is some presumably conscious >>>>> entity. >>>>> Therefore, it could be a zombie, and no physical test, experiment, or >>>>> measurement could ever (not even in theory) separate a zombie from a >>>>> non-zombie. This all follows directly from the standard definition of >>>>> epihpenominalism. Maybe there is no proof of another being being >>>>> conscious >>>>> or not, but that in itself is different from epiphenominalism, which >>>>> further >>>>> supposes that the existence of consciousness has no physical >>>>> consequences >>>>> nor yields any third-personal detectible differences in outcome or >>>>> behavior. >>>>> >>>> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: >>>> >>>> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. >>>> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no >>>> zombie equivalent of that being. >>>> >>> >>> Those don't seem compatible to me. 2 implies that there is some outward >>> behavior that the conscious being exhibits which cannot be exhibited by a >>> zombie. So the presence of that behavior is a test to determine whether >>> a >>> being is conscious. The test is essentially what Turing proposed. >>> >>> So I don't understand how you maintain the compatibility? Is it because >>> we >>> cannot identify the crucial outward behavior? I would agree that we an >>> never be certain we've identified it; a Turning test could go on for a >>> long >>> time and still reach the wrong conclusion. But I don't think we need to >>> achieve certainty. >>> >> My claim is that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent >> will also be conscious. >> > > But that asserts no being is conscious. The definition of "zombie > equivalent" is a being that acts the same and is NOT conscious. So the > conclusion "its zombie equivalent will be conscious" is a direct > contradiction and always false. So it is of the form "If X then FALSE." > which is false whenever X is true, i.e. whenever "a being is conscious." > So the statement can only be true if "a being is conscious" is always > false. But I know at least one being that is conscious. So it's > empirically false. >
OK, it was clumsy phrasing on my part. I meant that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent would be impossible, because it would also be conscious and hence not a zombie. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
