On Saturday, February 14, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> On 2/12/2015 10:23 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > On Friday, February 13, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected] > <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote: > >> On 2/11/2015 10:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>> On 12 February 2015 at 16:16, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> On 2/11/2015 7:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>>> >>>>> If zombies are impossible then what can be shown is that IF a certain >>>>>>> being is conscious THEN it is impossible to make a zombie equivalent. >>>>>>> But this cannot be used to show that consciousness exists either >>>>>>> generally or in a particular case. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Okay but I fail to see the connection of this statement to the one I >>>>>> made >>>>>> above. >>>>>> >>>>> The relevance is that I'm not saying that consciousness results in >>>>> physically detectable differences in behaviour, even though I am >>>>> saying that a certain type of behaviour may necessarily be associated >>>>> with consciousness. It's a bit subtle - it might seem contradictory at >>>>> first glance. >>>>> >>>>> I invoke Chalmers' >>>>>>>>> fading qualia argument, which shows that if consciousness were >>>>>>>>> contingent rather than necessary it would be possible to make >>>>>>>>> partial >>>>>>>>> zombies. Partial zombies are absurd; if they are not absurd then we >>>>>>>>> may as well say consciousness does not exist. >>>>>>>>> >>>>>>>>> If partial zombies are absurd, then so are full zombies. >>>>>>>> Epiphenominalism >>>>>>>> makes full zombies logically (if not physically by your definition) >>>>>>>> possible. Therefore I also find epihpenominalism absurd as the idea >>>>>>>> of >>>>>>>> partial zombies. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> I agree that full zombies are also absurd. There is a potential >>>>>>> problem here with the terms "absurd", "physically possible", >>>>>>> "logically possible", "conceptually possible". I think zombies are >>>>>>> conceptually possible, but I think they are logically impossible. I >>>>>>> don't see why you say epiphenomenalism (as opposed to some other >>>>>>> theory?) makes zombies logically possible. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Epihpenominalism makes zombies not only logically possible, but >>>>>> physically >>>>>> undetectable (because consciousness is presumed to have no effects, so >>>>>> whether it is present or not can never be ascertained). Under >>>>>> epihpenominalism, no physical text, measurement, or experiment, could >>>>>> ever >>>>>> detect the presence of consciousness is some presumably conscious >>>>>> entity. >>>>>> Therefore, it could be a zombie, and no physical test, experiment, or >>>>>> measurement could ever (not even in theory) separate a zombie from a >>>>>> non-zombie. This all follows directly from the standard definition of >>>>>> epihpenominalism. Maybe there is no proof of another being being >>>>>> conscious >>>>>> or not, but that in itself is different from epiphenominalism, which >>>>>> further >>>>>> supposes that the existence of consciousness has no physical >>>>>> consequences >>>>>> nor yields any third-personal detectible differences in outcome or >>>>>> behavior. >>>>>> >>>>> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: >>>>> >>>>> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. >>>>> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no >>>>> zombie equivalent of that being. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Those don't seem compatible to me. 2 implies that there is some outward >>>> behavior that the conscious being exhibits which cannot be exhibited by >>>> a >>>> zombie. So the presence of that behavior is a test to determine >>>> whether a >>>> being is conscious. The test is essentially what Turing proposed. >>>> >>>> So I don't understand how you maintain the compatibility? Is it >>>> because we >>>> cannot identify the crucial outward behavior? I would agree that we an >>>> never be certain we've identified it; a Turning test could go on for a >>>> long >>>> time and still reach the wrong conclusion. But I don't think we need to >>>> achieve certainty. >>>> >>> My claim is that IF a being is conscious THEN its zombie equivalent >>> will also be conscious. >>> >> >> But that asserts no being is conscious. The definition of "zombie >> equivalent" is a being that acts the same and is NOT conscious. So the >> conclusion "its zombie equivalent will be conscious" is a direct >> contradiction and always false. So it is of the form "If X then FALSE." >> which is false whenever X is true, i.e. whenever "a being is conscious." >> So the statement can only be true if "a being is conscious" is always >> false. But I know at least one being that is conscious. So it's >> empirically false. >> > > OK, it was clumsy phrasing on my part. I meant that IF a being is > conscious THEN its zombie equivalent would be impossible, because it would > also be conscious and hence not a zombie. > > > You mean a conscious being cannot have a zombie equivalent, i.e. a being > that behaves the same but is not conscious. In other words the > philosophical zombie is impossible: if a being is conscious then there can > be no other being that behaves the same but is not conscious. > Consciousness (nomologically?) entails some difference in behavior. Right? > Yes; but although this means there is a difference in behaviour between conscious and non-conscious beings, it does not provide a test for consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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