On 2/12/2015 9:15 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Feb 12, 2015 at 6:20 AM, Stathis Papaioannou <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
>> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and
>> > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are
>> > prohibited.
>>
>> No, as per my answer to Brent.
>
>
> The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does
mean
> that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a
change/difference
> in behaviors.
If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it.
You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness,
but not the other way around.
But then that is just a theory of supervienience/emergence, it is not epiphneominalism.
In interactionist dualism, if you remove the consciousness you cause behavioral/physical
changes since the immaterial mind can no longer control the body. With epiphenominalism,
you could eliminate the immaterial mind without having any changes in the physical world.
You use "could" in the sense of logically conceivable. But I use it nomologically, and
nomologically it is impossible to remove consciousness if it an epiphenomenon of
intelligent behavior.
Emergence/Supervienence would not be epiphenominal theories, since under them it is not
logically possible to remove or change consciousness without there being physically
detectible differences in the system.
No it is *logically* possible. You can't prove false from "There is no physical
difference, but the being is not conscious." But it is *nomologically* impossible - or at
least that's what I think epiphenomenal means. But I don't care about the semantics, if
that's what "emergent" means to you - fined call is emergent instead of epiphenomenal.
In epiphenominalism, what consciousness exists or doesn't exist, and how it may appear
to the experiencer is all up to the rules that govern the immaterial universe in which
the mind inhabits under epiphenominalism.
If there's an immaterial universe in which minds exist with rules independent of the
material universe, then that's dualism.
The way to view epiphenominalism is that our minds are immaterial souls on some ethereal
plane, and we receive information from a physical universe (in the same way a movie
might be projected to be viewed but not effected) into our conscious minds. Yet
regardless of what our minds decide to do with that information, we're only watching a
movie we can't change.
Depends on who you're calling "we". Does "we" include our brains?
If you really believe your thoughts and mental events have no effects on the physical
universe then that is epiphenominalism. Not just that you can ignore the higher
supervenient layers, but that you're better off not mentioning them at all under Occam's
razor, it's easier to just deny their existence altogether since they have no effects.
Like it's easier to do thermodynamics by referring only to the velocity and location of
molecules.
Brent
The only thing preventing you from cutting off your own mind via occam's razor is your
own consciousness which you have direct evidence of, but then you can only ever help to
justify solipsism if you cling to epiphenominalism. It's as dead-end of a theory as
Berkeley's idealism is as far as trying to figure out the properties and requirements of
conscious minds.
>> >> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible:
>> >>
>> >> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not.
>> >> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no
>> >> zombie equivalent of that being.
>> >>
>> >
>> > My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies
>> > epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that
>> > consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of
>> > consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference
>> > to
>> > the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious
>> > sensations disappeared entirely.
>>
>> I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism.
>>
>>
>
> Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and
> what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall
within
> epiphenominalism?
I'm not stuck on the term "epiphenomenalism" if it causes confusion.
I'll quote Brent:
"...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the
phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily
accompanies the phenomenon."
The "necessary" part is not part of the standard definition of epiphenominalism.
> Descartes Dualism
> Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony
> Berkeley's Idealism
> Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory
> Searle's Biological Naturalism
> Physicalism
> Functionalism
> Computationalism
> Eliminative Materialism
I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with
epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative
materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or
discount consciousness.
But none of those theories are forms of dualism. Wouldn't you agree that the
conventional account of epiphenominalism is a form of dualism?
Jason
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