On 12 February 2015 at 18:14, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote:
>> > Which means that consciousness tests are in theory possible, and >> > non-conscious zombies that exhibit those certain behaviors are >> > prohibited. >> >> No, as per my answer to Brent. > > > The logic above alone does not tell us what the tests are, but it does mean > that consciousness cannot be removed without there being a change/difference > in behaviors. If consciousness is supervenient then you can't selectively remove it. You can change the behaviour and that may change the consciousness, but not the other way around. >> >> Nevertheless, these two statements are compatible: >> >> >> >> 1. There is no way to determine if a being is conscious or not. >> >> 2. Given that a particular being is conscious, there could be no >> >> zombie equivalent of that being. >> >> >> > >> > My assertion is that neither of the above two statements is or implies >> > epiphenominalism. Epiphenominalism is the stronger statement that >> > consciousness has no effects, and so that presence or absence of >> > consciousness is dispensable and therefore it would make no difference >> > to >> > the future evolution of this universe if on next Thursday all conscious >> > sensations disappeared entirely. >> >> I think both statements are compatible with epiphenomenalism. >> >> > > Could you provide me with your definition of what epiphenominalism is and > what it is not? Which of these theories of mind you consider to fall within > epiphenominalism? I'm not stuck on the term "epiphenomenalism" if it causes confusion. I'll quote Brent: "...being an epiphenomenon means one can give a causal account of the phenomenon without mentioning it. But the epiphenomenon necessarily accompanies the phenomenon." > Descartes Dualism > Liebniz's Pre-established Harmony > Berkeley's Idealism > Smart's Mind-Brain Identity Theory > Searle's Biological Naturalism > Physicalism > Functionalism > Computationalism > Eliminative Materialism I think functionalism and computationalism are compatible with epiphenomenalism. Identity theory, physicalism and eliminative materialism could be compatible, although they tend to devalue or discount consciousness. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
