On 2/23/2015 12:58 PM, LizR wrote:
On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential quantifier
provides the same "exists" as ostensive physical existence.
That is clearly not being suggested by comp. Comp suggests that physical existence is
"maya" - an appearance generated by underlying platonic forms.
Do the Platonic forms have to exist in order to underlie maya? Bruno objects that he's
just using the ordinary existential quantifier - but that quantifier is relative to
predicates (predicates defined by the axioms in RA). It's not the same as ostensively
defined existence. So it's fine to say it's some underlying kind of existence but why
should we credence it as opposed to the dozens of other proposed underlying realities:
Yaweh, the implicate order, or quantum field theory? The test is whether the underlying
ontology is part of a theory that works at the level of prediction where it can connect
with the ostensive definitions.
If you are conflating the equals sign with physical existence, no wonder you've taken
against comp rather than merely being agnostic about it.
Who says I'm against it? That would be a strange attitude. I might think it's over
rated, but that's hardly being *against* it.
Also, did you give some reason to doubt the Turing emulability of brains, or to think
true randomness is a coherent notion?
I doubt the Turing emulability of brains without also emulating a lot of environment that
may affect the brain. For example, it's presented as relatively easy to replace a neuron
by a silicon based artificial neuron. But I think that's misleading because the silicon
based artificial neuron may respond quite differently to the 60Hz power EM and to hormones
in the blood and to particle radiation. It won't grow or lose connection in response to
usage. It's quantum entanglements will be different. So while it will provide a good
approximation of the brains function, it won't be exactly the same person. Bruno will say
it's just a matter of level and if we need to emulate at the molecular or atomic or
subatomic level so be it - arithmetic is infinite so anything's computable. But then it's
not so clear that you can neglect the quantum aspects which increase the computational
load exponentially. And is arithmetic really infinite?
I suspect that there are different kinds of consciousness depending on how intelligence,
memory, and learning are implemented. Jeff Hawkins has written an interesting book about
how he thinks the brain works; but it's quite different from how we would engineer an
intelligent Mars Rover. I don't think that shows the Mars Rover can't be conscious, but I
think it gives a good reason to believe its consciousness would be qualitatively different.
And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness. We seem to have done well with
it for a century. If you can accept randomness due to ignorance which can never be
informed, why not inherent randomness.
Brent
Sorry I don't have time to read everything, so if so I may have missed those.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to [email protected].
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
