On 23 Feb 2015, at 18:28, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Yes, as an explanation for the universe, is computationalism-math-
cellular automata can be falsified?
The point is only that if you assume that your brain (not the
universe) is Turing emulable, then the universe is no more explainable
by the choice of one theory (be it cellurlar automata, topological
functor, etc.). On the contrary, you have to explains the universe by
a sort of infinite games involving all explanations/theories/universal-
numbers.
What we can say is that IF my brain is Turing emulable, then the
physical/observable universe is definitely not
-a cellular automata
-a quantum cellular automata (although this one might be the winner
but that needs to be justfied)
-this universal system
-this other universal system
To be sure, the existence of a (completely 3p sharable) physical
realities is open, in the comp theory.
Or, maybe its simply the truth, and the physicists, let us say, who
don't like it, find it too annoying to deal with?
They do not address the problem. They are not aware of the amount of
induction they use in the implicit assumption that there is a physical
universe. But they progress, like in the line Galilee, Einstein,
Everett.
Many miss the biggest discovery of all time: the universal Turing
machine.
It is a recurring happening. In our story, and talking roughly, the
last time where the big bang, the origin of life, the origin of
brains, the origin of languages, the origin of computers, etc.
Universal machines loves to add and multiplies things, including
themselves, etc.
Plus, there's no funding for such a proof, as in a grant$, so why
bother?
What proofs? It is just computer science, and theology, in the old
sense (before it implies Aristotelian theologies, with creators and/or
creation).
There is no possible funding for fundamental research.
You are in the luckiest case when there is not to much funding
*against* fundamental research.
Refutation is not possible,
The point of the more technical part of what I try to convey is that
computationalism *is* testable, once you accept some classical
definition in analytical philosophy. But this is mainly agreeing that
knowable obeys the axioms (of S4):
knowable p -> p
knowable p -> knowable (knowable p)
knowable (p -> q) -> (knowable p -> knowable q)
Together with the modus ponens and the necessitation rule (from A
deduce knowable A).
Gödel's beweisbar predicate does not obeys to that logic, making it
into a belief instead of knowability, and indeed it will be an
indexical relative rational "belief". But this makes the theaetetus'
definition meaningful for the machine, and the intensional variant
(bewesibar("p") & p) obeys to S4 described above. (Indeed to S4 + Grz).
if the phenomena does not exist, or, alternatively, its a profound
fact of existence and thus, harder to measure and identify??
It is science, and it is far more easy to refute than string theory.
It is a matter of time, and interest we find in nature observable
refutable a proposition in ether S4Grz1, Z1*; or X1*.
But the main interest is that if we listen to the machine's theologies
(classical or weakened) we come back with the right, and perhaps
necessity, of doubt and critical research in the theological field.
Today, it is still argument by authority, with varying degree of
violence. It is the wolf argument, to follow leader.
Today, the human *applied* science is still this, summing up a little
bit:
1) the boss is right,
2) the boss is always right,
3) in the case the boss is wrong, apply 1 or 2,
4) especially in the case the boss is wrong, apply 1 or 2.
Our animal nature don't like nature teaching us the doubt, evolution
has not anticipated that brain would anticipate evolution, so it is
harder to be serious on the human issue when embedded in human
relation and living the first person experience. It is normal that
such an understanding can take time. But many pay the big price in
amount of avoidable suffering.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, Feb 23, 2015 11:47 am
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to
believe in the notion of Turing machines or Turing emulability
requires assuming at least something like the peano axioms.
I think there's a difference between arithmetical realism and
assuming there's a universal dovetailer that exists in at least the
Platonic sense.
We need only the existence (in the usual arithmetical sense) of the
UD and the computations. The existence of the UD is a theorem of PA,
or even RA.
Assuming the Peano Axioms means assuming they are 'true', not that
anything exists.
Once you assume PA, you derive the existence of many things, like
numbers, finite computations, and sequences of computations, etc.
For example s(0) = s(0), by identity axioms, and from this you can
derive already that the number 2 exists, by the existential
quantifier rule F(t) ==> ExFx): Ex(x = s(s(0))).
And I put 'true' in scare quotes because to show that there are
true but unprovable arithmetic propositions requires assuming that
the numbers are infinite, which I think it just a convenience, and
not a metaphysical necessity.
It is a mathematical necessity. if you assume a finite number of
numbers, you can prove 0 = 1 at the metalevel.
So to you use your remark as a critics, you would need an
ultrafinitist axioms, which indeed contradicts arithmetical realism,
and RA, PA, etc.
If you need to resort to ultrafinitism to escape the consequence,
you are defending computationalism, as virtually nobody believes in
ultrafinitism.
To be sure, I do not defend computationalism. I just study its
consequences, and I show that a classical version of comp is testable.
I do find computationalism plausible, though. But this is between
us, and I don't intend to defend computationalism (and this will not
prevent me to criticizing invalid argument against comp, or invalid
argument for comp, etc.). In fact it is the resemblance between the
comp solution to the mind-body problem and QM (without collapse)
which makes me feel that computationalism is plausible. Classical
computationalism? I am just quite astonished that this has not yet
been refuted.
Bruno
Brent
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