On 23 Feb 2015, at 20:42, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2015 7:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:01, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 3:43 PM, LizR wrote:
On 23 February 2015 at 12:32, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 2/22/2015 2:52 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 22, 2015 at 3:17 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
Computationalism is an extraordinary claim.
For it to be extraordinary, it would have to be beyond ordinary.
However computationalism isn't just ordinary but its the
majority opinion among philosophers of mind.
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically
and instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That is a deduction, not a postulate.
A deduction from what? That arithmetic exists
To say that "arithmetic exists" is ambiguous. The UDA-deduction use
only Church Thesis and "yes doctor". The AUDA deduction use only
Church thesis (to motivate the sigma_1 restriction).
But "yes doctor" is also ambiguous.
?
Does it mean that a physical substitution is possible (which most
people believe) or does it mean that an abstract computation is
enough.
It only means that you survive a physical substitution (a digital one,
made at some level ...).
Then it is proved, from that assumption, that the physical must be
explained by relative "abstract" computations, (which exists very
concretely in arithmetic. Keep in mind that for number theorist, like
hardy who I quoted on this subject, a natural numbers is the most
concrete thing he can think of ...).
And don't say that's invoking 'magic'. A physical substitution,
according to QM, entails entanglement with the environment.
This means only that you are using a very low level of substitution. I
have explained that this does not change anything in the reasoning. In
the UD* there are infinities of simulation of your brain entanglement
with your environment.
Or you mean that there is something physical needed which is not
Turing emulable, in which case we are out of the scope of the theory I
study the consequences of.
Which is why I think the MG argument only shows that movie graph
simulation will work within a world simulation - not within this
world.
I am interested in explaining things like "this world", so I work in a
theory which does not assume "this world".
Bruno
Brent
and there's a mapping from true theorems of PA to numbers?
Only the usual (and non computable!) mapping between arithmetical
proposition to {yes, no}. Physicists use them too.
They use that they are true relations, not the the referents exist.
Brent
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