On 24 February 2015 at 14:23, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 2/23/2015 12:58 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 24 February 2015 at 09:03, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > >> But then this undermines the idea that the arithmetic existential >> quantifier provides the same "exists" as ostensive physical existence. >> > > That is clearly not being suggested by comp. Comp suggests that physical > existence is "maya" - an appearance generated by underlying platonic forms. > > Do the Platonic forms have to exist in order to underlie maya? >
This is where we have to work out what "exist" means. Generally it's taken to mean "kicks back" - which maths and physical reality both do, or appear to do, although in different ways. > Bruno objects that he's just using the ordinary existential quantifier - > but that quantifier is relative to predicates (predicates defined by the > axioms in RA). It's not the same as ostensively defined existence. So > it's fine to say it's some underlying kind of existence but why should we > credence it as opposed to the dozens of other proposed underlying > realities: Yaweh, the implicate order, or quantum field theory? The test > is whether the underlying ontology is part of a theory that works at the > level of prediction where it can connect with the ostensive definitions. > This is where the unreasonable effectiveness comes in, or at least has to be hand-waved away. > If you are conflating the equals sign with physical existence, no > wonder you've taken against comp rather than merely being agnostic about it. > > Who says I'm against it? > You do, often. This particular discussion is in reaction to one such statement. > That would be a strange attitude. I might think it's over rated, but > that's hardly being *against* it. > > Yes I agree it is a strange attitude. > Also, did you give some reason to doubt the Turing emulability of brains, > or to think true randomness is a coherent notion? > > I doubt the Turing emulability of brains without also emulating a lot of > environment that may affect the brain. > Then you agree with Bruno, and you have contradicted your earlier comments about comp requiring extraordinary evidence. > > And I don't see anything incoherent about true randomness. We seem to > have done well with it for a century. If you can accept randomness due to > ignorance which can never be informed, why not inherent randomness. > It is of course possible that the universe works on "oracles" like this, this is just my personal bias towards explanations that don't require infinite amounts of "in-principle unknowable" data to be injected into physics. But I admit I could be wrong to have that bias. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
