Yes, as an explanation for the universe, is computationalism-math-cellular
automata can be falsified? Or, maybe its simply the truth, and the physicists,
let us say, who don't like it, find it too annoying to deal with? Plus, there's
no funding for such a proof, as in a grant$, so why bother? Refutation is not
possible, if the phenomena does not exist, or, alternatively, its a profound
fact of existence and thus, harder to measure and identify??
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Mon, Feb 23, 2015 11:47 am
Subject: Re: Philip Ball, MWI skeptic
On 23 Feb 2015, at 01:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/22/2015 4:38 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Not as Bruno uses it: That all computations exist Platonically and
instantiate all possible thoughts - and a lot of other stuff.
That's arithmetical realism, not computationalism. However, to believe
in the notion of Turing machines or Turing emulability requires assuming
at least something like the peano axioms.
I think there's a difference between arithmetical realism and assuming
there's a universal dovetailer that exists in at least the Platonic sense.
We need only the existence (in the usual arithmetical sense) of the UD and the
computations. The existence of the UD is a theorem of PA, or even RA.
Assuming the Peano Axioms means assuming they are 'true', not that
anything exists.
Once you assume PA, you derive the existence of many things, like numbers,
finite computations, and sequences of computations, etc.
For example s(0) = s(0), by identity axioms, and from this you can derive
already that the number 2 exists, by the existential quantifier rule F(t) ==>
ExFx): Ex(x = s(s(0))).
And I put 'true' in scare quotes because to show that there are true but
unprovable arithmetic propositions requires assuming that the numbers are
infinite, which I think it just a convenience, and not a metaphysical
necessity.
It is a mathematical necessity. if you assume a finite number of numbers, you
can prove 0 = 1 at the metalevel.
So to you use your remark as a critics, you would need an ultrafinitist axioms,
which indeed contradicts arithmetical realism, and RA, PA, etc.
If you need to resort to ultrafinitism to escape the consequence, you are
defending computationalism, as virtually nobody believes in ultrafinitism.
To be sure, I do not defend computationalism. I just study its consequences,
and I show that a classical version of comp is testable.
I do find computationalism plausible, though. But this is between us, and I
don't intend to defend computationalism (and this will not prevent me to
criticizing invalid argument against comp, or invalid argument for comp, etc.).
In fact it is the resemblance between the comp solution to the mind-body
problem and QM (without collapse) which makes me feel that computationalism is
plausible. Classical computationalism? I am just quite astonished that this has
not yet been refuted.
Bruno
Brent
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
