On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]
<javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','[email protected]');>> wrote:

>  On 3/8/2015 3:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On 3/8/2015 1:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>>> On 8 March 2015 at 09:33, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I like Graziano's theory of consciousness.
>>>>
>>>> http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/how-consciousness-works/
>>>>
>>>> I have generally been inclined to agree with JKC that natural selection
>>>> can't act on consciousness, only on intelligence; so consciousness is
>>>> either
>>>> a necessary byproduct of intelligence or it's a spandrel.  But under
>>>> Graziano's theory it's a way of augmenting or improving intelligence
>>>> within
>>>> constraints of limited computational resources.  So it would be subject
>>>> to
>>>> natural selection.  It also shows how to make intelligence machines
>>>> without
>>>> consciousness (albeit less efficient ones).
>>>>
>>> Graziano equates consciousness with a model of the brain's state of
>>> attention, but why couldn't this be done by an unconscious machine?
>>>
>>
>> Because doing it makes the machine conscious.
>
>
>  It might, but as presented it's begging he question.
>
>
> It proposes an architecture for computation that would realize
> consciousness. It's something that, in principle at least, could be
> constructed and one could interact with it and determine whether it seemed
> as conscious as you or I.  What would you consider a non-question begging
> theory?
>

A proof that that kind of architecture necessarily realises consciousness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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