On 3/8/2015 11:05 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

    On 3/8/2015 9:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


    On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

        On 3/8/2015 3:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


        On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

            On 3/8/2015 1:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

                On 8 March 2015 at 09:33, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

                    I like Graziano's theory of consciousness.

                    http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/how-consciousness-works/

                    I have generally been inclined to agree with JKC that 
natural
                    selection
                    can't act on consciousness, only on intelligence; so 
consciousness
                    is either
                    a necessary byproduct of intelligence or it's a spandrel.  
But under
                    Graziano's theory it's a way of augmenting or improving
                    intelligence within
                    constraints of limited computational resources. So it would 
be
                    subject to
                    natural selection.  It also shows how to make intelligence
                    machines without
                    consciousness (albeit less efficient ones).

                Graziano equates consciousness with a model of the brain's 
state of
                attention, but why couldn't this be done by an unconscious 
machine?


            Because doing it makes the machine conscious.


        It might, but as presented it's begging he question.

        It proposes an architecture for computation that would realize 
consciousness.
        It's something that, in principle at least, could be constructed and 
one could
interact with it and determine whether it seemed as conscious as you or I. What would you consider a non-question begging theory?


    A proof that that kind of architecture necessarily realises consciousness.

    What kind of proof?  Science doesn't provide proof - except maybe in the 
legal sense
    of "beyond reasonable doubt" which my proposed test does provide. 
Mathematical proof
    depends on some axioms which one hypothetically assumes for purposes of the
    argument.  Mathematical inference ensures that the conclusions are implicit 
in the
    axioms - so any axioms that prove something about consciousness necessarily 
include
    the conclusion and so beg the question.


Well, I think the argument I have presented before (due to Chalmers) proves that if consciousness is due to activity in the brain, making a substitution that preserves brain function will necessarily also preserve consciousness. If not, then the idea of consciousness becomes absurd.

OK, but Graziano is taking it a step further and trying to identify exactly which activity in the brain.

Brent

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