On 08 Mar 2015, at 19:55, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/8/2015 1:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 8 March 2015 at 09:33, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I like Graziano's theory of consciousness.
http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/how-consciousness-works/
I have generally been inclined to agree with JKC that natural
selection
can't act on consciousness, only on intelligence; so consciousness
is either
a necessary byproduct of intelligence or it's a spandrel. But under
Graziano's theory it's a way of augmenting or improving
intelligence within
constraints of limited computational resources. So it would be
subject to
natural selection. It also shows how to make intelligence
machines without
consciousness (albeit less efficient ones).
Graziano equates consciousness with a model of the brain's state of
attention, but why couldn't this be done by an unconscious machine?
Because doing it makes the machine conscious.
It's valid as psychological theory, but it does not address the Hard
Problem. That's not necessarily a bad thing - there is more to be
gained from investigating the Easy Problem.
Yes, it comports with my idea that the "hard problem" will be
dissolved by engineering solutions.
That is what hope the materialist: that consciousness dissolved with
mechanism. But that is what UDA precisely shows impossible to happen.
So, we can abandon mechanism, or we can abandon materialism (weak
materialism).
We don't have evidence for materialism, if you look around.
We do have evidence for consciousness (worst: we cannot genuinely
doubt it).
And we do have a non material theory (or realm) for consciousness.
Indeed, if we assume digital mechanism, that theory is computer
science, which happens to be embed-able in arithmetic.
I explain that computationalism reduces the mind-body problem to the
problem of explaining why some hallucination by numbers get persistent
and have that physical (symmetrical, quantum) look. And computer
science gives the propositional part of the solution. Like it gives
the constructive solution of Descartes self-reproduction problem.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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