On 09 Mar 2015, at 07:05, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/8/2015 9:37 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/8/2015 3:34 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Monday, March 9, 2015, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 3/8/2015 1:26 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On 8 March 2015 at 09:33, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
I like Graziano's theory of consciousness.
http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/how-consciousness-works/
I have generally been inclined to agree with JKC that natural
selection
can't act on consciousness, only on intelligence; so consciousness
is either
a necessary byproduct of intelligence or it's a spandrel. But under
Graziano's theory it's a way of augmenting or improving
intelligence within
constraints of limited computational resources. So it would be
subject to
natural selection. It also shows how to make intelligence
machines without
consciousness (albeit less efficient ones).
Graziano equates consciousness with a model of the brain's state of
attention, but why couldn't this be done by an unconscious machine?
Because doing it makes the machine conscious.
It might, but as presented it's begging he question.
It proposes an architecture for computation that would realize
consciousness. It's something that, in principle at least, could be
constructed and one could interact with it and determine whether it
seemed as conscious as you or I. What would you consider a non-
question begging theory?
A proof that that kind of architecture necessarily realises
consciousness.
What kind of proof? Science doesn't provide proof - except maybe in
the legal sense of "beyond reasonable doubt" which my proposed test
does provide. Mathematical proof depends on some axioms which one
hypothetically assumes for purposes of the argument. Mathematical
inference ensures that the conclusions are implicit in the axioms -
so any axioms that prove something about consciousness necessarily
include the conclusion and so beg the question.
Well, I think the argument I have presented before (due to Chalmers)
proves that if consciousness is due to activity in the brain, making
a substitution that preserves brain function will necessarily also
preserve consciousness. If not, then the idea of consciousness
becomes absurd.
But which brain function? If you take all brain function/activity, it
might be tautological. if you say the Turing emulable at the right
level, you get computationalism, and the fact that we cannot know
which level supports us, ... well all the consequence of computer
science.
Bruno
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Stathis Papaioannou
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