On 09 Mar 2015, at 19:16, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Ha! Your points seem unassailable, yet, buy example, how many
neurobiologists are believers in God?
Which God?
With computationalism, the notion of arithmetical truth is enough God
for me, and all neurobiologist believe it makes sense, by default.
This is the crux of the materialism argument. If God is not wearing
cowboy boots and barking out orders, they do not concede there could
be this fellow.
Do you know a neurobiologist who believe that Euclide is wrong when he
said that all prime number is followed by a bigger prime number?
They do believe, also by default, (like all creature with a brain
nearby) in Matter, but usually they are not interested in philosophy,
still less in the kind of mathematical philosophy that
computationalism promotes, so I am not sure where you get at.
My question to you is, does the universe, to you, look non-
mathematical, quasi-crytsals included?
It certainly looks non-mathematical, like a kiss, a movie screen, a
planet, the sun, a fellow, and my own consciousness *looks* non
mathematical.
But that is the key point which, concerning consciousness or the first
person experience, it does not look mathematical either. math is 3p,
so nothing about the first person, and its physical sensation, can
look mathematical or even mechanical, for the mathematical machines.
When you dream, it does not look like a brain handling information. It
looks like a lived story, with some scenario, + sensations,
qualitative knowledge, etc.
Assuming comp, not only it is easier to explain reality by machine or
intensional numbers dreams, but we have no choice in the matter if we
don't want to attribute magical properties to matter and god.
Here magical can be translated into (Non-Turing emulable V non FPI-
recoverable).
Computationalism, niot just with the FPI, confront the machine
relative intensional numbers) with the infinite and the non Turing
emulable, so not all the magic can't be eliminated, but
computationalism, if it is not refuted, minimize the use of the magic.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
To: everything-list <[email protected]>
Sent: Mon, Mar 9, 2015 12:20 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 08 Mar 2015, at 21:34, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Ah! But I never claimed that neurobiology, also know as materialism,
is the single, best, explanation for consciousness.
Nurobiology is not known as materialism. ture, it is plausible that
most neurobiologist are materialist (in the weak sense I use), but
their approach is computationalism: they reason in local cause and
effect, some relation can be analog, but usually not supposed to be
non-Turing emulable.
And they ignore that mechanism is incompatible (epistemologically)
with that weak materialism.
It might be the best working theory in our case though.
It is the best local current implementation we have, no doubt.
I tend to refer to our passions as from the amygdala, and our
reasoning from the neocortex/cerebrum. Am I correct?
I agree there is a part of the truth, but if you push that idea and
admit the amygdala and the neocortex are Turing emulable, the
details of the histories are sum on infinity of computations.
Physics assures us empirically that we share (thanks Everett
notably) a long and deep sheaf of common histories.
I think so, but is there room for a more complex process? Yes. The
brain could be both a computer and a transceiver. But we'd have to
detect or infer more evidence or plausibility for this.
It is OK. the "material" brain is consciousness filtred from true,
or consistent, points of view, defined relatievly in arithmetic.
Could different things in the universe be conscious?
"the universe" ?
Elementary arithmetic is full of life and dreams, there is a
physical reality, but it is unclear if that physical reality defines
a universe, or a cloud of partially gluable machine dreams.
And, yes, in the apparent universe, many things appears to be turing
universal, so other type of conscious beings cannot be excluded.
I was impress by a paper speculating on some quark star, who
stability was garantie by those compressed quark playing a "error
correction" sort of quantum game.
Well, i did weakly refer to Hoyle's The Black Cloud and boltzmann
brains. I don't hold that dirt, and clouds, and stones, are
conscious, as some have asserted.
There is a difference between saying that a pebble is conscious, and
that a pebble supports consciousness.
I don't think pebbles are conscious, nor that they support
consciousness, in any genuine sense. But a quasi cristal, or a
Penrose pavage can already constitute a universal dovetailing, and
that supports all consciousness digitally possible (and thus us, by
comp).
I am also a bit doubtful of the Beckenstein Bound which asserts that
the maximum calculating power of the universe is 1x10^123. I think
its an estimation, without calculating the solids, liquids, and
gases, and plasma, that comprise the cosmos. It's not that I am
saying I am smarter then a big physicist, but that I think I
sometimes see logical flaws in what they say.
OK. Interesting numbers, but we have to take them with grain of
salt, as they borrow a lot of assumptions.
This doesn't mean I am smarter, just a bit more observant.
But you do seem assume a primary physical reality, in this post. I
gave arguments that this does not make sense if the brain function
like some sort of natural machine, like the neurobiologist assumes.
You might need to (re?)-read the UDA argument. The mind-body
problem is reduced to justify the beliefs (by "numbers") in a
physical reality. The self-reference logics provides the
communicable and the non communicable part of that number
introspection process (arithmetical process).
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: Bruno Marchal < [email protected]>
To: everything-list < [email protected]>
Sent: Sun, Mar 8, 2015 12:51 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On 08 Mar 2015, at 12:12, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote:
Well, here's a thought. Intelligence/Consciousness as humans
experience needs lots and lots of spindle cells, or something
manufactured that imitates it. This is neurobiology, and thus,
materialism.
Not at all. This is neurobiology and thus *mechanism*.
But then, looking at the detail, (see UDA) mechanism is incompatible
with materialism.
Neurobiologist detect functions, or number relations. They don't
detect matter. Even the Hadron collider does not detect "matter".
Could there be other things that do what spindle cells do? Yes. I
mean, there could be gas clouds or boltzmann brains doing thinking
way above our pay grade. But back down to earth, we need spindle
cells.
We need what they seem able to do, perhaps.
Bruno
-----Original Message-----
From: John Clark < [email protected]>
To: everything-list < [email protected]>
Sent: Sat, Mar 7, 2015 10:25 pm
Subject: Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness
On Sat, Mar 7, 2015 at 5:33 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
> I like Graziano's theory of consciousness.
He says consciousness is just another name for attention, but
computers have been paying attention to some things and not others
form almost as long as they've existed. For example the LHC produces
nearly a billion particle collisions per second and each collision
produces about one megabyte of data, so you'd need 200,000 DVDs each
second the LHC is in operation to store that much information, and
it's designed to be in operation 20 hours a day 300 days a year.
Even a computer can't remember all that, Instead the computers looks
at each collision and quickly decides if there is anything that
*might* be worthy of its attention and remembers only them.
So out of the billion collisions each second the computer only
remembers and pays attention to what happened in about 200
collisions, all the other data is just thrown away. Even so that's
still a HUGE amount of information to store. There is always the
possibility you're throwing away something important but there is no
alternative, you just can't keep it all.
> under Graziano's theory it's a way of augmenting or improving
intelligence within constraints of limited computational resources.
Is so then it would be easier to make a intelligent conscious
computer than a intelligent non-conscious computer.
John K Clark
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