On 12 Mar 2015, at 17:22, John Clark wrote:



On Wed, Mar 11, 2015 at 6:50 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

>> I am claiming that when I receive anesthesia I become both unintelligent and non-conscious. I am also claiming that when any of my fellow human beings receive a anesthesia they behave unintelligently, but I can make no conclusion of any sort regarding the effect the drug has on their consciousness UNLESS I assume that the Turing Test is valid and Darwin's Theory of Evolution is true.

> So you agree that we do judge whether or not beings are conscious more or less accurately

I think so, but that's only because every human being who has ever lived has implicitly assumed that the Turing Test is valid, it's only when it's applied to computers that people suddenly want to change the rules of the game.

The turing test is a good criteria for consciousness and intelligence. It concerns only the easy part of the consciousness problem, and it assumes some "real" universal number (the physical universe). It is the best test FAPP, but the worst for explaining consciousness, and matter.





> and so a theory about consciousness that predicts consciousness in some situation might be empirically invalidated.

A theory of consciousness can be proven false *PROVIDED* you assume as I do that the Turing Test is valid and Darwin's Theory of Evolution is true; then a theory of consciousness is equivalent to a theory of intelligence.

I can agree, but then you are deluded if this has something to do with competence, and intelligence becomes what makes possible to get competence and develop it, adapt it.

Consciousness is 1-self knowledge. Self-consciousness is when you distinguish the 1-self from the 3-self.

It has nothing to do with what a machine can represent, unlike their beliefs. You might extends intelligence too much, and close to the other possible confusion, between consciousness and self-consciousness.



I can understand why armchair consciousness theorists are reluctant to make that equivalence, it makes their job far far more difficult because good intelligence theories are HARD, but if that assumption is not made then no theory of consciousness is scientific.

The universal machines already refutes this, they can justify their own incompleteness phenomenon. G proves <>t -> ~[]<>t.

Consciousness is a belief in a reality, be it only in a pain, or a physical universe, or whatever bigger or simpler.

By Godel's completeness theorem, being consistent is about equal in being satisfied by a reality.

Intelligence is more emotional, it is a state of mind, closer to conscience than consciousness. It might need nothing more than a loving mother, or having enough attention after birth, and not too much: it is a complex art, not made easier by long stories and collection of cultural prejudices.

I have two theory of intelligence:

The first one is based on reading the arithmetical beweisbar ~[]~t, <>t, as "intelligent". Its negation, []f, is "stupidity". You can see then that stupidity is mainly either the belief in its own intelligence, or the belief in its own stupidity.

G proves []<>t -> []f   (and G* proves []f -> f).

G* proves [][]f -> []f.

Note that those machines which believe that they are stupid, are much less stupid than the machine who believe that their are intelligent. Why? Because, the machines which believe that they are stupid, only God knows that they are stupid.

A machine which believes []^n f, is less stupid than a machine which believes []^m f if m is least than n.

For those stupid machine which believe that they are intelligent ([]<>t), all machines (once Löbian) knows, soon or later, that they are stupid, given that they can prove <>t -> ~[]<>t.

Read "believe" by "rationally justified", and <>t by NOT Beweisbar ("0 = 0") in arithmetic. Then G axiomatized what the machine cvan rationally justify, and G* what is true. G* \ G axiomatizes what is true about the machine, but that the (consistent) machine cannot rationally justified.

And that theory, taking into account the nuance brought by Theaetetus for the first person knowledge, and the nuance brought by the FPI, gives the logic of the observable (the locally certain proposition), like drinking a cup of coffee (in the preceding though experience), and that is testable.

Observable is more like intelligence + some reality, and sensible is more like intelligence + some reality + some truth.

Bruno


Bruno





  John K Clark




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